



# Public Awareness Report on Information Manipulation

TTPs and documented cases,  
January–May 2026

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION  
AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

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According to its mandate, established by Article 8 of Law 242 of 31.07.2023, the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation (the Centre) carries out activities to identify **foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI)** by analysing online data available in public space.

These actions support the mission of consolidating inter-institutional efforts in the fight against FIMI that pose a danger or may jeopardise the achievement of national interests including maintaining peace, consolidating democracy, social cohesion, accession to the European Union, strengthening the economy, increasing resilience in the regional security context and bolstering the defence sector.<sup>1</sup>In this regard, the mission envisages protecting major events taking place on national territory, such as key democratic exercises (especially elections) or large-scale events with strong international visibility.

To identify FIMI actions, in accordance with the information threats detected between 2025-2026<sup>2</sup>, the Centre monitored the activities of online ecosystems and networks with known connections to hostile foreign powers, or to individuals or legal entities aligned with their interests. This operational approach is based on an analysis of the adversary's modus operandi in the information space (online behavioural analysis).

This Report is public and is intended for partners in the media, civil society and academia. Its purpose is to provide a clearer understanding of the typology, complexity and persistence of FIMI operations documented by the Centre. The Report presents a set of cases documented between January–May 2026.

The document does not contain sensitive information, details on analytical tools, sources, institutional partners or operational priorities. The cases presented are synthesised in such a way as to serve exclusively the objectives of awareness, education and increasing the resilience of civilian actors.

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<sup>1</sup>According to the Concept of strategic communication and countering disinformation, foreign information manipulation and interference for the years 2024–2030, approved by Parliament Decision No. 416 of 22/12/2023.

<sup>2</sup>Information threats facing the Republic of Moldova and how they affect democratic exercises [https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Raport\\_Amenintari\\_2025\\_Proгноza\\_2026.pdf](https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Raport_Amenintari_2025_Proгноza_2026.pdf)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This report summarises a selection of cases analysed by the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation between January–May 2026, with the aim of raising public awareness about how information manipulation works, the methods used to manipulate public debates and influence societal perceptions, and how sensitive topics in the public information space of the Republic of Moldova can be exploited.

The cases presented do not constitute an exhaustive list of incidents assessed by the Centre, but rather relevant examples showing the main tactics observed and documented during the analysed period:

- use of inauthentic accounts,
- artificial amplification of messages,
- imitation of media sources,
- using content generated with artificial intelligence,
- exploitation of online surveys,
- instrumentalization of external publications and
- combining information manipulation with monetising mechanisms through traffic and advertisements.

The infrastructure and coordinated operations related to each case represent a particular feature. On Facebook, a network of **175 inauthentic accounts** was identified, used to artificially promote manipulative socio-political messages. On TikTok, a network of **259 inauthentic accounts** was documented, with over **532 thousand followers**, which, between 1 January–14 April 2026, generated **14,370 posts**, approximately **2.6 million interactions** and approximately **115.6 million views**. These cases show that information manipulation quickly adapts to platforms with large audiences and uses short, emotional and easily shareable formats.

The report also highlights how real issues are manipulatively reframed by exploiting the sensitivities of the Moldovan public. The campaign regarding the alleged bringing of “**300 thousand migrants**” to the Republic of Moldova transformed the discussion about the labour shortage and the impact on the capacity for economic growth into an alarmist narrative about “population replacement”, loss of identity and threats to sovereignty. The analysed activity highlighted over **1,940 posts and reposts** at an accelerated pace indicating a coordinated amplification rather than an organic reaction of the public.

Another relevant case is the exploitation of the Dereanu Church incident. A legal and administrative dispute was transformed into a narrative about the “state attack on faith”, “forced Romanianisation” and the repetition of the “Ukraine scenario”. The topic generated over **2,380 posts**, accumulating approximately **6.437 million views** and **241 thousand**

**interactions** in a short period of time. The case shows how a local incident can be captured informationally and turned into a theme of religious, identity and geopolitical polarisation.

The report also includes cases showing the use of **seemingly neutral or legitimate forms of influence**. Online surveys promoted through Odnoklassniki and the VKReklama infrastructure, with redirection to the survey.we-change[.]ru domain, targeted sensitive topics such as the EU, NATO, the CIS, the Russian Federation, neutrality, the Orthodox Church, unification with Romania, the Transnistrian region, and the war in Ukraine. This case reveals that online surveys can be used not only for data collection but also for testing social vulnerabilities and introducing manipulative prerequisites directly into the process of filling out the questionnaire.

Another type of documented vulnerability is the exploitation of **transnational clickbait infrastructures**. The infrastructure associated with thecisclub[.]com website is composed of a network of **83 websites** targeting **32 countries**. In the Republic of Moldova, the content was distributed through the “Life Stories” page and used the image of political figures to promote false, alarmist or misleading articles. The case shows that information manipulation can be combined with commercial objectives, by attracting traffic and monetising it through advertisements.

The report also analyses **the mechanisms of external validation of hostile narratives**. The case of the French publication Omerta illustrates how anti-government messages about the Republic of Moldova can be placed in a Western source with a controversial profile and later reintroduced into the domestic information space as alleged confirmations from the European press. This technique can affect both the perceptions of the domestic public and the external image of the Republic of Moldova. The use of a French-language publication is not accidental - the moderate scepticism of the French population towards EU enlargement is known<sup>3</sup>, and a negative image of the Republic of Moldova could increase opposition to its inclusion in the EU.

**Overall, the cases analysed show that information manipulation is not limited to isolated fakes or obvious propaganda messages. It operates through networks, infrastructures, accounts, platforms, formats and themes adapted to different audiences. Malign actors exploit real or perceived vulnerabilities - economic, social, religious, identity and security - to amplify distrust in institutions, polarise society and weaken support for the European direction of the Republic of Moldova.**

**The report aims to contribute to increasing public resilience by explaining these methods in accessible language. Understanding how such operations work is essential for citizens, the media, civil society and public institutions to be able to more quickly recognise attempts at manipulation, critically verify information sources and reduce the impact of hostile campaigns on public debate.**

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<sup>3</sup> [https://euneighbourseast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/attitudes-towards-eu-enlargement\\_sp564\\_report\\_v6.pdf](https://euneighbourseast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/attitudes-towards-eu-enlargement_sp564_report_v6.pdf), page 12.

## CHAPTER 1. EXPLANATION OF TTPs (TECHNIQUES, TACTICS, PROCEDURES) FOR RAISING PUBLIC AWARENESS OF INFORMATION MANIPULATION

### TTP 1: Coordinated inauthentic network on Facebook

The Facebook platform is used because it facilitates access to large groups of people who share the same attributes. During 12–15 April 2026, the Centre identified a network on Facebook based on coordinated inauthentic behaviour, consisting of **175 accounts**, used to publish and artificially amplify manipulative political messages. The accounts attempted to appear as real profiles by using local names, sometimes written in Cyrillic script, images taken from other people or generated with artificial intelligence, and neutral lifestyle content. The network promoted manipulative messages about the activity of state institutions, content favourable to actors affiliated with Ilan Shor (e.g. “Наша Автономия”, Evghenia Gutul and GRT) and alarmist themes related to the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia. The full case is presented in **ANNEX 1** and **ANNEX 8**.

The case is relevant because it shows how fake profiles can be progressively built to appear authentic and then used to create the impression of real public support; Facebook's removal of all **175 accounts** confirms the inauthentic nature of the network.

### TTP 2: The network of inauthentic accounts on TikTok

The TikTok platform is used to spread manipulative messages. During 10–14 April 2026, the Centre documented a network of **259 inauthentic accounts** on TikTok, which accumulated over **532 thousand followers**. Between 1 January–14 April 2026, these accounts published **14,370 posts**, generating approximately **2.6 million interactions** and approximately **115.6 million views**. The network used content generated or modified with artificial intelligence and imitated media sources or civic pages, promoting false messages regarding the economic crisis, corruption, loss of sovereignty, Gagauzia autonomous region and the negative effects of rapprochement with the EU and Romania. The full case is presented in **ANNEX 2**.

The case is relevant because it shows the adaptation of information manipulation to TikTok, where short, emotional, and repetitive content can quickly reach large audiences, including young people, with users not realising that they are being exposed to a coordinated operation.

### TTP 3: X-coordinated amplification of the "300 thousand migrants" narrative

Platform X is used to create the impression that the distributed messages are validated externally, from Western sources. In May 2026, the narrative according to which the Republic of Moldova would receive **“300 thousand migrants”** was amplified in a coordinated manner on platform X. The campaign transformed a real economic theme - the

labour shortage - into an alarmist message about “population replacement”, non-European migration and the loss of national identity. The analysed activity included approximately **1,943 posts and reposts**, and the temporal analysis shows that, out of **1,953 consecutive intervals** between reposts, **1,171** occurred at an interval of maximum **60 seconds**, and **804** at a maximum **30 seconds**. The full case is presented in **ANNEX 3**.

The case is relevant because it shows how an economic issue can be quickly reframed in a narrative of social fear and identity conflict, while the dynamics of redistributions indicate a coordinated amplification rather than an organic public reaction.

#### **TTP 4: Informational exploitation of the Dereneu incident**

Between 27 January–11 February 2026, the incident surrounding the Assumption of the Virgin Mary Church in Dereneu was intensely exploited in the information space. The topic generated **2,381 posts**, of which **2,171**, or **91%**, were distributed by malicious actors; they accumulated approximately **6.437 million views** and **241 thousand interactions**. A legal and administrative dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the church was transformed into a narrative about the “state attack on faith”, “forced Romanianisation” and the repetition of the “Ukraine scenario”. The full case is presented in **ANNEX 4**.

The case is relevant because it shows that the objective of manipulative actors is to create artificial social divisions. A local incident can be captured informationally and converted into a theme of religious, identity and geopolitical polarisation, with an impact on trust in the state, the police and the European path of the Republic of Moldova.

#### **TTP 5: Online surveys promoted through Russian infrastructure**

On 29 March 2026, the Centre identified the promotion of an online survey addressed to citizens of the Republic of Moldova through Odnoklassniki and the VKReklama advertising infrastructure, with redirection to the **survey.we-change[.]ru** domain. The survey was conducted under the auspices of the Russian company ООО “Неравнодушный гражданин”, connected to the institutional ecosystem of the Russian Federation, including through contracts with Russian institutions and with VCIOM (All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research). The questions concerned polarising topics such as the EU, NATO, the CIS, the Russian Federation, neutrality, unification with Romania, the Orthodox Church, the Transnistrian region and the war in Ukraine, and some formulations reproduced the language of the Kremlin, including the expression “special military operation”. The full case is presented in **ANNEX 5** and **ANNEX 9**.

The case matters because it shows that online surveys can be used not only for data collection, but also for testing societal vulnerabilities and introducing manipulative prerequisites directly into the process of completing the questionnaire.

## TTP 6: Transnational network of clickbait and manipulation sites

The Centre identified a transnational infrastructure of websites and Facebook pages that exploited the image of political figures to promote false, sensationalist, or misleading articles. In the Republic of Moldova, the content was distributed through the “Life Stories” page, which directed users to **thecisclub[.]com**. The site is part of a network of **83 websites** targeting **32 countries**, with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The full case is presented in **ANNEX 6** and **ANNEX 10**.

The case matters because it shows how information manipulation can be combined with monetising through advertising: the image of political leaders is used to attract clicks, and traffic is turned into profit, while the information space is contaminated with false and alarmist articles.

## TTP 7: Using the Omerta publication to legitimise anti-government messages

In April 2026, the French publication **Omerta** was used to promote anti-government messages about the Republic of Moldova, later presented domestically as “opinions from the French press”. The materials described the Republic of Moldova as a state controlled from abroad, a “geopolitical laboratory” and a space administered by Western interests, while the state leadership was described using formulas such as “mafia” or “organised crime”. The complete case is presented in **ANNEX 7**.

The case matters because it illustrates the mechanism of external validation: hostile narratives are placed in a Western publication with a controversial profile, then reintroduced in the Republic of Moldova as supposedly independent confirmations from the European press. This technique can affect both domestic perceptions and the external image of the Republic of Moldova.

## CHAPTER 2. ANTICIPATIVE TRENDS IN THE OPERATIONAL FORECAST FOR 2026 AND OBSERVED DEVELOPMENTS

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As also mentioned in the Operational Forecast for 2026<sup>4</sup>, hostile actors are transitioning from visible interventions, focused on electoral moments, to a strategy of continuous pressure on the EU accession process and on the relationship between the state and the citizen. In the absence of immediate electoral opportunities, the focus is shifting towards preparing the ground for future electoral cycles, by testing and refining the infrastructures of influence.

The cases documented during the analysed period are part of this trend and confirm it. Inauthentic networks on Facebook and TikTok, coordinated amplification on X, surveys promoted through Russian digital infrastructure, transnational clickbait sites and the use of European publications with pro-Russian connections indicate an activity aimed at consolidating influence mechanisms that can be quickly reactivated in electoral, social tension or crisis contexts.

A first manifestation observed is **the testing and consolidation of multi-platform infrastructures**. Malign actors have used different platforms for different functions: Facebook to build the appearance of social support, TikTok to quickly distribute emotional content, X for accelerated amplification and international export, Telegram for narrative mobilisation, Odnoklassniki and VKReklama for data collection through surveys, and external websites and publications for monetising or reputation validation. This diversification shows that information pressure depends on a flexible ecosystem rather than on a single channel.

A second manifestation is **the pressure on the state-citizen relationship**. As previously anticipated, hostile actors would exploit administrative, economic, and social vulnerabilities to induce the perception of a state unable to deliver, explain, and protect. In the cases analysed, the state is repeatedly presented as corrupt, captured, hostile to citizens, repressive, inefficient, or subordinate to external interests. Real or sensitive issues—prices, reforms, migration, religion, security, local autonomy, justice, or public order—are reframed as evidence of systemic failure.

A third manifestation is **the direct and indirect attack on the European path**. The forecast for 2026 indicated that one of the central objectives of hostile actors will be to reinforce the narrative framework according to which the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the EU is either impossible or undesirable. In documented cases, this direction appears by associating the EU with loss of sovereignty, external control, abandonment of traditional markets, imposed reforms, economic costs, identity tensions and security risks. Even when

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<sup>4</sup> [https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Raport\\_Amenintari\\_2025\\_Proгноza\\_2026.pdf](https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Raport_Amenintari_2025_Proгноza_2026.pdf), page 30









the messages are not explicitly anti-EU, they indirectly affect support for integration by eroding trust in the state and in the capacity of institutions to manage reforms.

A fourth manifestation is **the simultaneous exploitation of identity, economic and security vulnerabilities to create artificial divisions in society**. Themes regarding the Church, Romanianisation, the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, migration, prices, energy, CIS, neutrality, NATO, the war in Ukraine and the Transnistrian region have been used to produce cumulative effects. The aim is not just to promote a specific message, but to connect several social anxieties into a broader narrative about a vulnerable state, controlled from outside and incapable of protecting citizens.

A fifth manifestation is **the external projection of internal vulnerabilities**. Cases involving European publications with pro-Russian connections or transnational networks of websites show that malign actors do not only target the domestic public. Messages about the Republic of Moldova as a state that is unstable, corrupt, externally controlled or incapable of advancing reforms can be exported to the European information space, where they can cause reputational damage and affect the perception of the country's European credibility.

A sixth manifestation is **the instrumentalisation of seemingly neutral or legitimate formats**. During the period under review, manipulation did not only occur through obvious propaganda sources. It was packaged in accounts that imitate ordinary citizens, pages that present themselves as media sources, apparently sociological surveys, clickbait articles, Western publications, and videos generated or modified with the help of artificial intelligence. This strategy reduces the ability of the public to quickly identify the manipulative nature of the content.

Overall, the documented developments indicate a cumulative information pressure. The stakes are not only the promotion of occasional falsehoods, but also the accumulation of a state of distrust, cynicism and social fatigue, in which any real vulnerability can be quickly transformed into a legitimacy crisis of the state and the European path. This pressure prepares the ground for future electoral cycles and for the rapid exploitation of any political, social or security crisis.

Trends Mentioned in the 2026 Forecast and Manifestations Observed in the Case Studies	
Correlation of the forecast threat lines with examples identified in the analyzed cases	
Trend Mentioned in the 2026 Forecast	Manifestations Observed in the Case Studies
 <b>1</b> Continued pressure on the EU accession process	> The EU is associated with loss of sovereignty, external control, abandonment of traditional markets, and imposed reforms.
 <b>2</b> Erosion of the state-citizen relationship	> The state is portrayed as unable to protect citizens, manage the economy, uphold the rule of law, or deliver justice.
 <b>3</b> Exploitation of reforms and internal processes	> Reforms are presented as sham reforms, external pressure, administrative control, or an attack on local autonomy.
 <b>4</b> Affecting external perceptions of the Republic of Moldova	> European publications with pro-Russian profiles and transnational networks project the image of an unstable, corrupt, or externally controlled state.
 <b>5</b> Fragmentation of domestic support for the EU	> Identity, religious, social, and geopolitical themes are used to divide the public and reduce consensus on the European course.
 <b>6</b> Exploitation of security as a sensitive topic	> Neutrality, NATO, the war in Ukraine, the Transnistrian region, and Western control are used to activate fear of conflict.
 <b>7</b> Integrated functioning of the influence ecosystem	> The cases show the combined use of inauthentic accounts, pseudo-media, influencers, surveys, websites, external publications, and coordinated amplification.
 <b>Conclusion</b>	The case studies confirm that the trends forecast for 2026 are already manifesting through recurring narratives, coordinated amplification mechanisms, and the projection of negative effects on the European path and the resilience of the Republic of Moldova.

## CHAPTER 3. THEMES AND MESSAGES EXPLOITED BY MALIGN INFRASTRUCTURES

The developments documented in the analysed case studies show that malicious sources systematically exploited a relatively stable set of vulnerable themes. These themes were adapted depending on the platform, audience, and context, but pursued the same general objective: to erode trust in the state, amplify social polarisation, and weaken support for the European path of the Republic of Moldova.

The scheme of vulnerable themes can be organised into five dimensions: **identity, welfare, security, public order and safety**, as well as **democratic legitimacy and trust in the state**. European integration functions as a cross-cutting theme, being directly or indirectly attacked through all these dimensions.

### Identity

Identity themes were used to activate fears related to religion, traditional values, local autonomy, Romanianisation, migration, children and education. In the analysed infrastructures, identity messages had the role of turning legal, administrative or social topics into emotional conflicts.

Through these messages, malicious actors have attempted to convert identity into a polarisation tool. Religion, local autonomy, migration, school, or the relationship with Romania are treated as emotional alarm signals, meant to induce fear, indignation, and opposition to the authorities rather than topics of public debate. In the Dereanu case, this logic is visible by turning a legal dispute into a narrative about “the state’s attack on faith” and “forced Romanianisation.”

Themes exploited and messages used by malicious sources	
 <b>Religion / Church</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“The state attacks the Church”</li> <li>“The government is against faith”</li> <li>“Orthodoxy is persecuted”</li> </ul>
 <b>Language</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Language is politicized”</li> <li>“The state imposes a foreign agenda”</li> </ul>
 <b>Traditional values</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“The West attacks the family and traditional values”</li> <li>“European integration means losing our values”</li> </ul>
 <b>Romanianization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“The authorities are imposing Romanianization”</li> <li>“The Church serves Romania’s interests”</li> <li>“School is becoming identity propaganda”</li> </ul>
 <b>UTA Gagauzia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Gagauz autonomy is under attack”</li> <li>“Chisinau persecutes local leaders”</li> <li>“The central authorities will revoke the Gagauz people’s rights”</li> </ul>
 <b>Migration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Moldova will bring in 300,000 immigrants”</li> <li>“The local population will be replaced”</li> <li>“Non-European migrants will destroy the country”</li> </ul>
 <b>Children / school</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Children are being used politically”</li> <li>“School spreads propaganda”</li> <li>“Education reforms are imposed without consultation”</li> </ul>

## Welfare






Welfare themes were used to link everyday difficulties to state failure and the European path. Malign sources exploited the cost of living, energy, agriculture, traditional markets, poverty, labour shortages, local development, and public services.

These messages often start from real problems and reframe them in a logic of systemic failure. The goal is not to explain economic causes, the goal is to transform social discontent into distrust of the state, reforms and European integration. The labour shortage topic was a clear example: a real economic problem was transformed into a narrative about the loss of control over the country.

## Security

Security themes were used to activate anxieties related to war, NATO, neutrality, Ukraine, the Transnistrian region, sovereignty, and external control. In the malign infrastructure, security is presented as a danger posed by rapprochement with the West rather than an area of state capacity building.

These messages aim to block rational debate about security. Any foreign cooperation, defence reform, or discussion of resilience is reinterpreted as preparation for war, loss of neutrality, or subordination to the West. In the survey promoted through Russian infrastructure, this logic was visible through manipulatively formulated questions about NATO, the CIS, neutrality, the Russian Federation, and the war in

Themes exploited and messages used by malicious sources	
 <b>Prices / cost of living</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prices are rising, and the government does nothing</li> <li>Ordinary people are abandoned</li> <li>The standard of living is declining because of the government</li> </ul>
 <b>Energy / gas</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russian gas was the stable solution</li> <li>The authorities created new dependencies</li> <li>Closer ties with the EU made energy more expensive</li> </ul>
 <b>Agriculture / farmers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Farmers are abandoned</li> <li>The state does not support local producers</li> <li>The government is destroying the rural economy</li> </ul>
 <b>Traditional markets / CIS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leaving the CIS destroyed traditional economic ties</li> <li>The EU does not compensate for the loss of eastern markets</li> </ul>
 <b>Poverty / pensions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pensioners and vulnerable people are abandoned</li> <li>The state does not protect ordinary citizens</li> </ul>
 <b>Labor shortage</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The state brings in migrants instead of attracting the diaspora</li> <li>The authorities are creating a new problem</li> <li>The economic crisis is not being solved</li> </ul>
 <b>Local development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The government pressures mayors</li> <li>The state blocks local projects</li> <li>Capable people are being punished</li> </ul>
 <b>Public services</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reforms reduce access to services</li> <li>Villages are being abandoned</li> <li>Decisions are imposed without consultation</li> </ul>

Themes exploited and messages used by malicious sources	
 <b>Neutrality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Neutrality is being abolished"</li> <li>"Moldova is being pushed toward war"</li> <li>"any external cooperation means militarization"</li> </ul>
 <b>NATO / militarization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Cooperation with NATO prepares involvement in conflict"</li> <li>"The West is militarizing Moldova"</li> <li>"the army is being modernized for war"</li> </ul>
 <b>The war in Ukraine</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Ukraine and the West are to blame"</li> <li>"Russia is conducting a special military operation"</li> <li>"the war is being used to draw Moldova into conflict"</li> </ul>
 <b>Transnistrian region</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Chisinau threatens the region"</li> <li>"the authorities are creating tensions"</li> <li>"Moldova is being used in a regional conflict"</li> </ul>
 <b>Sovereignty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Moldova is controlled from abroad"</li> <li>"the state is surrendering national interests"</li> <li>"the EU and Romania dictate decisions"</li> </ul>
 <b>Western control</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Moldova is a geopolitical laboratory"</li> <li>"globalists and Soros control the government"</li> <li>"the West rules from the shadows"</li> </ul>
 <b>Defense</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Defense modernization is preparation for war"</li> <li>"external cooperation weakens neutrality"</li> </ul>
 <b>The Ukraine scenario</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The Republic of Moldova is repeating Ukraine's scenario"</li> <li>"The Church is being persecuted as in Ukraine"</li> <li>"the West is pushing Moldova down the same path"</li> </ul>

Ukraine, including using Kremlin propaganda language.

### Public order and public safety

A distinct theme exploited by malign sources is that of public order, police, and citizen safety. This is used to construct two parallel perceptions: either the state is repressive toward citizens, or the state is incapable of protecting society from crime, drugs, violence, or abuse.

The police theme is directly highlighted by the Dereneu case, where malicious sources promoted the idea that the police and authorities are against faith, and one of the intended effects was the delegitimation of public order institutions.

The theme of crime and drugs needs to be treated more cautiously: it does not appear as a central topic in the case studies of the current report but is part of a broader range of narratives through which malign ecosystems project the image of a state that is incapable, complicit or overwhelmed by public safety risks. For this reason, it is assessed as a related sub-theme of public safety, not as a separate pillar.

### Democratic legitimacy and trust in the state

This dimension appears transversally in all the cases analysed. Malign actors have attacked elections, justice, the press, reforms, institutions, administrative capacity and the external image of the Republic of Moldova. The objective is to degrade public trust in the state as a legitimate institution.

Themes exploited and messages used by malicious sources	
 <b>Police / MIA / GPI</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The police are a repressive instrument"</li> <li>"The MIA carries out the government's orders"</li> <li>"The police intimidate citizens"</li> <li>"Public order institutions are used politically"</li> </ul>
 <b>Public order</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The state is causing tensions"</li> <li>"The authorities repress ordinary people"</li> <li>"Law enforcement does not protect citizens"</li> </ul>
 <b>Perceived abuses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The authorities use force against people"</li> <li>"The state punishes inconvenient communities"</li> <li>"Institutional interventions are abusive"</li> </ul>
 <b>Safety of children and youth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Children are exposed to dangers because of the state"</li> <li>"Schools and institutions no longer protect young people"</li> <li>"The government ignores moral and social decline"</li> </ul>
 <b>Crime / drugs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The state does not control crime"</li> <li>"Drugs are reaching children and young people"</li> <li>"Institutions tolerate or protect criminal networks"</li> </ul>
 <b>Smuggling</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The Republic of Moldova is becoming a route for illegal activities"</li> <li>"Institutions do not control borders and criminal networks"</li> </ul>
 <b>Violence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The state cannot prevent violence"</li> <li>"Institutions react selectively"</li> <li>"Citizens are left without protection"</li> </ul>
 <b>Social tensions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The authorities are provoking the population"</li> <li>"Society is being pushed toward conflict"</li> <li>"The state creates divisions between communities"</li> </ul>

Themes exploited and messages used by malicious sources	
 <b>Elections</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Elections are rigged"</li> <li>"the results are decided in advance"</li> <li>"the opposition has no real chances"</li> <li>"foreign assistance means political control"</li> </ul>
 <b>Justice</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Criminal cases are used against the opposition"</li> <li>"justice is a political weapon"</li> <li>"the state persecutes inconvenient actors"</li> </ul>
 <b>Corruption</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The government is corrupt"</li> <li>"the state is captured"</li> <li>"institutions are used for political interests"</li> </ul>
 <b>Press / censorship</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The press is controlled"</li> <li>"TV channels are shut down because they tell the truth"</li> <li>"critical voices are silenced"</li> </ul>
 <b>Reforms</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Reforms are simulated"</li> <li>"vetting strengthens external control"</li> <li>"reforms are imposed without consultation"</li> </ul>
 <b>Institutions / administration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Institutions do not deliver"</li> <li>"the administration is incapable"</li> <li>"the state punishes local initiative"</li> </ul>
 <b>External image</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Moldova is unstable, corrupt, and controlled from abroad"</li> <li>"the state is presented as a problem for external partners"</li> </ul>
 <b>European credibility</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"The Republic of Moldova is not ready for the EU"</li> <li>"the state cannot implement reforms"</li> <li>"accession is impossible or undesirable"</li> </ul>

This dimension is essential to understanding the report. Identity, well-being, security and public order are entry points, the ultimate effect residing in the erosion of state legitimacy and trust in the strategic direction of the Republic of Moldova. Attacks on elections, justice, the press, reforms and external image are the element connecting the specific themes within a broader delegitimisation framework.

### **European integration as a cross-cutting theme**

European integration does not just appear as a separate theme, but as a cross-cutting aspect in almost all categories analysed. Malign actors associate it with loss of sovereignty, external control, economic costs, abandonment of traditional markets, imposed reforms, attacks on identity and the free exercise of religion, militarisation, and instability.

The recurring messages were:

- "The EU controls the Republic of Moldova";
- "Accession means loss of sovereignty";
- "European reforms are simulated or imposed";
- "Rapprochement with the EU destroyed traditional economic relations";
- "The Republic of Moldova is not ready for the EU";
- "Western support is politically conditional";
- "Moldova is being used as a geopolitical laboratory."

This theme is important because it shows that besides attacking specific policies, the objective is to affect the internal and external consensus on the strategic direction of the Republic of Moldova. In the case of the Omerta publication and transnational networks, this dimension also acquires an external component: the messages can cause reputational damage to the Republic of Moldova in the European information space.

### **Evaluation of the thematic scheme**

The expanded scheme allows for a more accurate description of how malign actors use different themes for the same objective: eroding trust in the state, fragmenting society, and weakening internal and external support for the European path of the Republic of Moldova.

Through this scheme, the report highlights that European integration is being attacked not only through direct anti-EU messages but also through the accumulation of narratives that undermine trust in the state, in institutions, in reforms, in security and in the ability of the Republic of Moldova to act as a credible European partner.

MALIGN NARRATIVES – DIMENSIONS AND EXPLOITED THEMES				
1. IDENTITY	2. WELL-BEING	3. SECURITY	4. PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY	5. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND TRUST IN THE STATE
 <p>Attacks on national, cultural, religious, and social identity.</p>	 <p>Messages that exploit economic concerns and daily hardship.</p>	 <p>Narratives that induce fear and instability through security and geopolitical themes.</p>	 <p>Messages that undermine trust in institutions responsible for public order and safety.</p>	 <p>Narratives that erode trust in democratic processes and state institutions.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Religion / Church</li> <li> Language</li> <li> Traditional values</li> <li> Romanianization</li> <li> UTA Gagauzia</li> <li> Migration</li> <li> Children / school</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Prices / cost of living</li> <li> Energy / gas</li> <li> Agriculture / farmers</li> <li> Traditional markets / CIS</li> <li> Poverty / pensions</li> <li> Labor shortage</li> <li> Local development</li> <li> Public services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Neutrality</li> <li> NATO / militarization</li> <li> The war in Ukraine</li> <li> Transnistrian region</li> <li> Sovereignty</li> <li> Western control</li> <li> Defense</li> <li> The Ukraine scenario</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Police / MAI / GPI</li> <li> Public order</li> <li> Perceived abuses</li> <li> Children's and youth safety</li> <li> Crime / drugs</li> <li> Smuggling</li> <li> Violence</li> <li> Social tensions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Elections</li> <li> Justice</li> <li> Corruption</li> <li> Press / censorship</li> <li> Reforms</li> <li> Institutions / administration</li> <li> External image</li> <li> European credibility</li> </ul>

## CONCLUSIONS

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The cases analysed in this report show that information manipulation targeting the Republic of Moldova is not limited to punctual fakes or obvious propaganda messages. It operates through infrastructures, platforms, accounts, formats and themes adapted to different categories of public. Inauthentic networks on Facebook and TikTok, coordinated amplification on X, surveys promoted through Russian infrastructure, transnational clickbait sites and the use of European publications with a problematic profile indicate the existence of a flexible ecosystem, capable of quickly exploiting sensitive topics in the public space.

**Hostile actors seek to build a false appearance of public support.** Inauthentic accounts, coordinated reactions, accelerated reposts and imitation of media sources create the impression that certain opinions are widespread in society. In fact, the visibility of these messages is often artificially constructed. This mechanism is dangerous because it can influence the perception of the public, the media and institutions on a supposed “majority opinion”.

**Information manipulation is developing and increasingly shifting its focus from content to infrastructure.** It is not only the message that matters, but also the mechanism by which it is produced, multiplied and legitimised. Facebook is used to simulate social support, TikTok for emotional viralisation, X for rapid amplification and international export, Odnoklassniki and VKReklama for polling and profiling, and foreign publications or transnational sites for reputation validation and monetising. This distribution of roles between platforms indicates a high level of operational adaptation.

**The main target of these operations is** the relationship between the state and the citizen. In all the cases analysed, the state is presented as either incapable of delivering results, or as repressive, corrupt, externally controlled, or hostile to the identity, faith, and interests of citizens. Real or sensitive issues - prices, labour shortages, migration, reforms, religion, local autonomy, security, justice, or public order - are reframed as evidence of systemic failure.

**European integration is under attack not only directly, but also through cumulative effect.** Explicit anti-EU messages are complemented by narratives that present reforms as imposed, cooperation with Western partners as a loss of sovereignty, security modernisation as preparation for war, and rapprochement with Romania or the EU as an identity threat. In this way, support for the European path is indirectly eroded by weakening trust in the institutions that must manage the reforms.

**Identity, religious and regional themes remain major vulnerabilities.** The Dereneu case, the narratives about the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, Romanianisation, the

Church, autonomy and traditional values show that malign actors are trying to transform social and cultural differences into lines of conflict. The goal does not reside in public debate, but rather in emotional polarisation and creating the impression that the state is acting against certain communities, regions or identities.

**The use of artificial intelligence reduces costs and increases the speed of influence operations.** AI-generated or modified content allows for the rapid production of text, images, voices, and videos tailored for different platforms. This trend makes manipulation more scalable, less recognisable to the public, and easier to reactivate around current events.

**Information manipulation can be combined with commercial objectives.** The network of associated sites thecisclub[.]com shows that disinformation, political scandal and the exploitation of the image of public figures can be used to generate traffic and advertising revenue. Even if the immediate motivation may be financial, the effect on the public space remains harmful: the public is exposed to false or misleading content, and distrust and cynicism are amplified.

**Hostile narratives are increasingly validated by external sources.** The Omerta case shows how a message can be placed in a Western publication with a problematic profile and then reintroduced into the domestic information space as an “opinion from the European press.” This technique is effective because it gives the message an appearance of external credibility and can affect both domestic perceptions and the image of the Republic of Moldova in the European space.

**Overall, the major strategic risk lies not only in the impact of each separate case but also in the cumulative effect of these operations. The repetition of the same themes - incapable state, corrupt institutions, the EU as an external control factor, threatened identity, fragile security, authorities disconnected from citizens - produces a state of distrust, social fatigue and cynicism. This state of mind can be quickly exploited during electoral periods, political crises, protests or sensitive public decisions.**

## ANNEXES EXPLAINING TTPs (TECHNIQUES, TACTICS, PROCEDURES) FOR RAISING PUBLIC AWARENESS OF INFORMATION MANIPULATION

### ANNEX 1: COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC NETWORK ON FACEBOOK INVOLVED IN PROMOTING MANIPULATIVE MESSAGES

#### Context

Between 12–15 April 2026, the Centre identified a coordinated inauthentic behaviour network on Facebook, consisting of **175 accounts** (see Annex 8), used to publish and artificially amplify politically manipulative messages. The network promoted messages critical of the current government, content favourable to actors affiliated with Ilan Shor, and topics related to the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, in a context marked by local political and electoral uncertainties.

The case is relevant because it shows how seemingly ordinary profiles can be gradually built to appear authentic and then used in a coordinated manner to influence public perceptions.

#### What was observed?

A key element confirming the inauthentic nature of the network is the fact that **all 175 identified accounts were subsequently removed by Facebook moderators**. This measure indicates that the platform found violations of its rules on account authenticity and coordinated behaviour, thus confirming the assessment that the network was inauthentic.

The accounts had several common characteristics: the use of Romanian first and last names written in Cyrillic script, profile images taken from other people (see Fig. 1) or generated with the help of artificial intelligence, as well as the publication of repetitive texts, written in a uniform style.

To create the impression of real profiles, the accounts posted cover content, such as lifestyle photos, recreational activities, hobbies, or simple messages about daily life. These posts generally had a low level of genuine interaction.

In parallel, the same accounts were publishing or amplifying manipulative political messages. Unlike cover posts, political content benefited from reactions, comments, and shares from other accounts in the same network, which shows the existence of a coordinated mechanism of artificial amplification.




Fig.1. Example of visual identity theft

## How the network worked

The network had an organised operating logic. Some accounts published the main messages, while others had the role of supporting them through reactions, comments, and shares. Thus, the posts seemed to have real support from several users, although the visibility was artificially built.

After gaining a certain level of visibility, some accounts also began to share videos that were thematically synchronised with the text messages. These clips reprised the same messages in audiovisual format and demonstrated a higher level of sharing and interaction, indicating an attempt to increase the impact of the network.

In some cases, the content was also redistributed to local Facebook groups (see Fig. 2), including communities in different regions of the country. The goal was to expand the messages beyond the initial network circle and expose genuine users to manipulative content.




Fig. 2. Forced promotion on interest or local pages

## Themes promoted

Instead of focusing on a single theme, the network covered several topics of public interest, adapted to current events.

The main topics and directions were:

Militarisation/war	<i>There are no alternatives - either we remain neutral or we go to war.</i>	Social fear; challenging cooperation with Western partners; undermining the need to modernise the army in order to weaken the security of the Republic of Moldova
Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and internal tensions	<i>"The central authorities persecute Gagauz autonomous region through the press and fabricated convictions, with the ultimate goal of nullifying the legitimate right of the Gagauz people to choose their leadership"</i>	Societal polarisation; internal fragmentation through the instrumentalisation of tensions between central and local authorities in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia.
Democratic processes	<i>"Elections are rigged, results are predetermined"; "The opposition is eliminated through criminal cases, not through voting"; "Justice is used as a political weapon against the inconvenient"</i>	Discrediting electoral processes and democratic institutions by inducing the perception that the results are predetermined and that the opposition has no real chance; legitimising anti-institutional discourse and normalising the idea that the rule of law is an instrument of political repression
External actions	<i>"Moldova lost its sovereignty in exchange for EU promises"; "Leaving the CIS destroyed traditional economic relations and made living more expensive"; "We didn't choose, it was chosen for us"</i>	Eroding popular support for European integration by presenting foreign policy decisions as imposed from outside, not assumed sovereignly; cultivating nostalgia for the post-Soviet space (CIS) as a viable economic alternative;
Security	<i>"The norm regarding the review of neutrality = preparing the ground for total capitulation"; "RM gives in to foreign intervention interests"</i>	Fuelling the fear of war and loss of sovereignty; delegitimising any constitutional reform related to security or European integration.
Religious identity/traditional values	<i>They want to replace the Moldovan Orthodox Church with a structure in the service of the West"; "What is holy to me is a political instrument for governance"</i>	Mobilising believers by attacking religious identity; transforming government into an enemy of faith
National identity	<i>"In schools, children are forced to sing about unification with Romania"; "School is now a propaganda centre"; "The government uses children in political warfare"</i>	Destruction of trust in the state education system; activation of identity fears related to unification with Romania among the population of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the Transnistrian region;

European integration	<i>"The government is not focusing on real reforms; it is only mimicking them"; "The verification is only meant to consolidate control over Moldova"</i>	Presenting the EU-Moldova partnership as a subordination relationship; Diversion of legitimate aspiration towards European standards.
Local development	<i>"The government is putting pressure on city halls; Ilan Shor's team led the localities to development, and the government has systematically blocked city hall projects."</i>	Presenting the resignation of an opposition mayor as evidence of systemic repression; Building the image of a state that punishes initiative and suffocates capable people.

### Targeted impact

The network's primary objective was to create a false impression of public support for certain political messages. Through volume, repetition, and coordinated interactions, the network's operators attempted to make these messages appear more popular and widespread than they were.

In the case of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, the network's activity seems oriented towards influencing the local political climate, strengthening the pro-autonomist discourse, and promoting actors affiliated with interests hostile to the central authorities.

In the longer term, the network aimed to undermine trust in state institutions, increase polarisation, and prepare an ecosystem of accounts capable of rapidly amplifying manipulative messages during electoral or institutional crisis periods.

### Why does it matter?

This case shows that information manipulation is not limited to websites, television, Telegram channels, or visible political pages. It can also be carried out through networks of fake accounts that mimic the behaviour of ordinary citizens.

Through such methods, the public can be repeatedly exposed to the same messages, giving the impression that they reflect a widespread opinion in society. In fact, visibility is artificially built through inauthentic accounts, coordinated with each other.

Facebook's removal of all **175 accounts** is one of the main pieces of evidence that the documented network was inauthentic and coordinated.

### Conclusion

The network identified on Facebook presents the characteristics of a coordinated information manipulation operation: inauthentic accounts, cover content, messages generated or assisted by artificial intelligence, differentiated roles between accounts, and artificial amplification.

The case points to an operation designed to influence public perceptions, artificially increase the visibility of political messages, and fuel distrust in state institutions. By removing all identified accounts, Facebook further confirmed the inauthentic nature of this network.

## ANNEX 2: NETWORK OF INAUTHENTIC ACCOUNTS ON TIKTOK INVOLVED IN PROMOTING MANIPULATIVE MESSAGES

### Context

Between 10–14 April 2026, the Centre documented the activity of a network consisting of **259 inauthentic accounts on TikTok**, involved in distributing manipulative messages through content generated or modified with the help of artificial intelligence.

The network has accumulated, in total, over **532 thousand followers**. During the period **1 January - 14 April 2026**, the accounts published **14,370 posts**, which generated approximately **2.6 million interactions**. Of these, there were approximately **1.94 million reactions**, **167.7 thousand comments** and **500.8 thousand shares**. At the same time, the content published by the network recorded an impact/visibility of approximately **115.6 million views**, which indicates a high capacity to amplify and distribute messages in the information space (Fig. 3.).



Fig. 3. Network of inauthentic activity

The case is relevant because it shows how TikTok can be used to quickly distribute emotional, simplified, and conflicting messages, especially to broad audiences, including young people or people who predominantly consume short video content.

### What was observed?

The accounts analysed shared content fabricated or modified with the help of artificial intelligence: texts, images, videos and audio recordings. In some cases, the content was presented in a way that misled the public about real events or statements by public figures.

A significant segment of the network attempted to imitate media sources or news channels. Among the names used were formulas such as **FOCUS.MD**, **OJO.NEWS**, **InfoRM.md**, **Context News**,

**BuzzMD, REAL.MD, Mama News, Moldoscope, ProjectorMD, Tik Tok NEWS MOLDOVA, Știri 26, POLITIK\_TOP or The Briefing Room.** These names suggest the intention to create the appearance of credible journalistic sources.

Another segment used names with civic, identity or nationalist overtones, such as **Demnitatea Neamului, FreeMoldova, Moldova pe Față, MoldoVibe, Md.FARA FILTRU, Pulsul Moldovei, Moldova XXI or MatAndMold.** These formulas are built to attract the Moldovan public and to give an impression of genuine concern for societal issues.

### **Indicators of coordinated nature**

Account creation data shows an inorganic pattern. Most accounts were created recently, with **82 accounts, or 31.7% of the total,** opened in November 2025 alone.

Several accounts were created in close time intervals and use similar names, which indicates the existence of an organised infrastructure rather than a spontaneous activity of independent users.

Through this structure, the network attempted to create an ecosystem of accounts that appear different from each other, but that share compatible messages and pursue the same influencing goals.

### **How the network worked**

The network used three main methods.

- **The first method** was to disguise themselves as media sources or civic channels. Through name and visual presentation, the accounts tried to appear as news pages, opinion platforms, or independent voices of society.
- **Second method** was the systematic use of artificial intelligence. AI-generated content was used to rapidly produce texts, voices, images, and videos that could convey socio-political messages in an easily shareable form.
- **Third method** was the exploitation of the TikTok format. The messages were short, emotional, and conflicting, adapted for quick consumption and mass distribution.

### **Promoted messages**

The network promoted several narrative directions:

- economic difficulties, including rising fuel, utility and food prices;
- the idea that government measures are insufficient or ineffective;
- presenting administrative and educational reforms as measures imposed without public consultation;
- suggesting that the reforms would reduce local autonomy and access to services in rural areas;
- promoting themes regarding the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, Gagauz autonomous region and the alleged unification with Romania;
- eroding trust in the judiciary, Parliament and Government through issues such as corruption, nepotism, lack of transparency and controversial decisions;

- presenting the Republic of Moldova's exit from the CIS and its rapprochement with the EU and Romania as sources of economic vulnerability, loss of traditional markets and impairment of sovereignty.

These themes often start from real or sensitive issues, but are presented selectively and in a conflicting manner, to transform everyday dissatisfaction into institutional distrust.

### Targeted impact

The network's goal was to amplify the perception of a permanent crisis in the Republic of Moldova. Through video, audio, and AI-generated text content, the network sought to induce the idea that the state is incapable of managing economic, social, and institutional problems.

At the same time, the messages aimed to weaken trust in the strategic direction of the Republic of Moldova, especially in its rapprochement with the EU and Romania. By associating European integration with economic losses, loss of sovereignty, or abandonment of traditional markets, the network attempted to reduce public support for the European path.

This type of activity contributes to the polarisation of society, the radicalisation of public discourse, and the creation of a favourable environment for external influence.

### Why does it matter?

This case shows that information manipulation quickly adapts to platforms consumed by the public. On TikTok, messages don't have to be long or elaborate to have an impact. They can be simple, emotional, repeated, and distributed by accounts that appear to be media sources, civic pages, or regular users.

The use of artificial intelligence makes content production faster, cheaper, and harder for the public to detect. In this way, a network of accounts can generate large volumes of content and influence user perceptions with them not realising that they are being exposed to a coordinated operation.

### Conclusion

The network of inauthentic accounts identified on TikTok exhibits the characteristics of a coordinated influence operation: accounts created in waves, similar names, imitation of media sources, use of artificial intelligence, and promotion of the same manipulative themes.

Through its **259 accounts**, over **532 thousand followers**, **14,370 posts** and approximately **2.6 million interactions**, the network had the capacity to massively distribute messages designed to exploit social frustrations, erode trust in institutions and affect support for the European direction of the Republic of Moldova.

### ANNEX 3: X-COORDINATED AMPLIFICATION OF THE “300 THOUSAND MIGRANTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA” NARRATIVE


#### Context

At the beginning of May 2026, the topic that the Republic of Moldova would "import"/receive **300 thousand foreign workers** was promoted in the information space on the X platform. The topic was manipulatively presented as a threat to the identity, social security and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.

The campaign exploited public statements about the labour shortage and turned them into an alarmist message about "population replacement", "import of non-European migrants" and the so-called "destruction of the country".

#### What was observed?

A first important vector of promotion was Diana Panchenko, associated with the account **@Panchenko\_X**<sup>5</sup>. This is a Russian propagandist<sup>6</sup> originating from Ukraine, **included on the EU sanctions list**<sup>7</sup> for the production and distribution of pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian and anti-NATO materials. Previously, she was also involved in promoting information manipulation materials targeting the Republic of Moldova.



In the past, Diana Panchenko exploited the topic of poverty in the city of Balti, including by promoting a YouTube contest of tragic stories of local citizens, in which she offered remuneration to people willing to make their negative experiences public. In the analysed case, the same informational actress exploited the topic of labour shortage to promote the idea that the population of the Republic of Moldova would be “replaced” by bringing in hundreds of thousands of migrants.

A second amplification cluster was formed by accounts like **daily\_romania**<sup>8</sup>, **AFpost**<sup>9</sup>, **GlobalDiss**<sup>10</sup> and **Matt\_Bracken48**<sup>11</sup>. They promoted the central message that the Republic of

<sup>5</sup> <https://archive.ph/LMFC6>

<sup>6</sup> <https://archive.ph/Wgm2r>

<sup>7</sup> <https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/180252>

<sup>8</sup> <https://archive.ph/Xs1RW>


<sup>9</sup> <https://archive.ph/MCSKN>

<sup>10</sup> <https://archive.ph/qhwHI>

<sup>11</sup> <https://archive.ph/N8f92>

Moldova would need or would bring in **300,000 foreign workers**, which would mean "population replacement", "import of non-European migrants" and "destruction of the country".

The two clusters promoted the topic in a short period of time with the total volume of the analysed activity reaching approximately **1,943 posts and reposts (Fig. 4)**.



### Indicators of inauthentic coordination

Temporal analysis indicates an accelerated and concentrated pace of reposts. Of the 1,953 consecutive intervals between redistributions, 1,171 occurred within 60 seconds, and 804 within 30 seconds. In some time windows, up to 8 reposts were identified in less than a minute, especially for messages published by daily\_romania and Panchenko\_X. This pattern suggests a rapid and coordinated amplification of the narrative, rather than a slow organic spread based on independent user reactions.

Another behavioural indicator is the structure of the handles of the accounts involved in amplification. Of the 1,671 unique accounts identified, 795 contain digits in their handles, and 458 end with at least three digits. This pattern alone does not constitute evidence of inauthenticity, as real users can also use digits in their account names. However, in the context of an activity dominated by redistributions, concentrated in time and oriented towards the amplification of the same source-messages,

<sup>12</sup> <https://archive.ph/LMFC6>


<sup>13</sup> <https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/180252>

the massive presence of handles with numbers may indicate the use of poorly personalised accounts, created quickly or used mainly for amplification.

The accounts used as primary sources generated significant volumes of redistributions from the total analysed.

This data shows that the topic did not circulate by

chance but was pushed into the information space by accounts with a clear amplification role.



### Method used

The campaign combined several methods of manipulation.

The first method was **to exaggerate and distort a real issue**. The issue of labour shortage was transformed into an alarmist message about migration, identity, and "population replacement."

The second method was **to simultaneously activate multiple audiences**. Through accounts like daily\_romania, the message appears to have targeted the Romanian nationalist audience. Through Panchenko\_X, the message was directed at the Russian-speaking or pro-Russian audience.

The third method was **artificial amplification**. The large number of reposts in a very short time indicates that the message was pushed in a coordinated manner to create the impression of a massive public reaction.

### Promoted messages

The main messages promoted were the following:

- The Republic of Moldova would bring hundreds of thousands of migrants;
- Migrants would pose a danger to the local population;
- The authorities would prepare a demographic change without consulting citizens;
- The state would try to solve the labour shortage by replacing the population instead of supporting citizens or attracting the diaspora;
- Rapprochement with the EU or Western policies would favour the loss of identity and sovereignty.

These messages were constructed to transform an economic discussion about the labour market into a theme of social fear and identity conflict.

### Targeted impact

The campaign targeted three main directions.

First, it aimed to affect **social cohesion** by inducing fear of migrants and presenting migration as a threat to the local population.

Second, it targeted **economic resilience**, by presenting the labour shortage as evidence of state failure and the inability of the authorities to manage the economy.

Third, it aimed to damage **support for European integration**, by associating migration with the EU agenda, Western policies, or the loss of control over domestic decisions.

### Why does it matter?

This case shows how a real economic issue can quickly be turned into a narrative of fear, hostility, and mistrust. The labour shortage issue has been reframed as a demographic and identity threat.

Through coordinated promotion on X, the actors involved tried to create the impression that there was a broad public reaction against an alleged policy of “importing” migrants. In fact, the dynamics of redistributions indicates artificial and coordinated behaviour.

### Conclusion

The campaign regarding "300 thousand migrants in the Republic of Moldova" is an example of information manipulation by exploiting a sensitive topic: migration. The narrative was promoted through malicious influencers, pseudo-media, and anonymised accounts, most likely inauthentic.

The involvement of Diana Panchenko / **@Panchenko\_X**, an actor included on the EU sanctions list, provides an additional indicator of the hostile nature of the campaign.

**Redistributions were identified at very short time intervals. Of 1,953 consecutive intervals between redistributions, 1,171 occurred within 60 seconds of each other, and 804 within 30 seconds of each other.**

**The rapid pace of redistributions suggests coordinated or semi-automated mobilisation, especially when combined with the repetition of the same messages and reliance on a few central sources.**

## ANNEX 4: INFORMATIONAL EXPLOITATION OF THE DERENEU CHURCH INCIDENT

### Context

Between 27 January–11 February 2026, the incident surrounding the "Assumption of the Virgin Mary" Church in Dereneu was intensely exploited in the information space. The subject started from the tensions generated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 12 June 2025 regarding the transfer of the church under the jurisdiction of the Metropolis of Bessarabia.

Although the case was based on a legal and administrative dispute, malicious actors quickly turned it into a religious, identity-based, and geopolitically charged issue. The incident was presented as a “state attack on faith,” as a form of “forced Romanianisation,” and as an alleged repetition of the “Ukraine scenario” in the Republic of Moldova.




Fig. 7. Accelerated content distribution

### Actors involved

In the domestic space, the case was introduced and amplified by sources and actors associated with the malign ecosystem, including channels affiliated with the "SHOR" network, such as TV6, Canal 5, Gagauznews, KP Moldova.

The topic has also been taken up by external malicious actors. Among them is REST Media<sup>14</sup>(The centre has previously been shown to be a covert Russian propaganda project)<sup>15</sup>, who presented the incident as a repeat of the Ukrainian scenario, as well as Margarita Simonyan<sup>16</sup>, RT and the Russian information manipulation network Pravda, which promoted accusations against the pro-European government of the Republic of Moldova.

<sup>14</sup> <https://archive.ph/2EBsl>

<sup>15</sup> [https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/TTP-Raport\\_Interferente-1.pdf](https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/TTP-Raport_Interferente-1.pdf), pp.11-13.

<sup>16</sup> <https://archive.ph/Q9yRC>

Another **external vector** was **UOJ-America**<sup>17</sup>- Union of Orthodox Journalists of America. This structure is **part of the ecosystem of the Union of Orthodox Journalists, founded in Ukraine** in 2014 to support the Ukrainian Orthodox Church<sup>18</sup> subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The organisation is sanctioned by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine<sup>19</sup>for pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation activities.

The figure displays two social media posts. The top post is from REST Media, featuring a photograph of a church interior with people and candles. The text below the photo reads: "Ukrainian-style church conflict escalates in Moldova. Another attempted seizure of a church has been reported in Moldova, where tensions are growing between the canonical Moldovan Orthodox Church and the Bessarabian Metropolis aligned with the Romanian Patriarchate. The latest incident occurred in the village of Dereneu, where parishioners resisted efforts by a priest from the Bessarabian structure to forcibly take over a church, allegedly with passive police support." The bottom post is from UOJ-America, featuring a photograph of police officers and a priest. The text reads: "DERENEU, MOLDOVA — A confrontation erupted on January 27 around the Church of the Dormition of the Most Holy Theotokos in the village of Dereneu, as parishioners of the Moldovan Metropolis accused representatives of the Bessarabian Metropolis of attempting to seize control of the church by force, according to local media." Below the photo is a news-style graphic with the headline "Parishioners Block Church Seizure in Moldova" and the sub-headline "A renewed clash in Dereneu highlights escalating tensions over church control in Moldova." The graphic also includes the UOJ-USA logo and the URL "https://uoj.news".

**Fig. 8. Involvement of entities from the Russian propaganda infrastructure in the Denereu case**

<sup>17</sup> <https://archive.ph/mizQW>

<sup>18</sup> <https://archive.ph/F1uJ2>

<sup>19</sup> <https://archive.ph/wyWG9>


Inauthentic influencers and accounts, previously used in other campaigns associated with the interests of the Russian Federation, were also involved on the X platform, particularly for promoting messages to the English-speaking public.

## How the topic was amplified

The topic did not circulate organically, but was taken up in a chain, in a short period of time, by several thematically and narratively connected sources.

The amplification model was as follows (Fig.9):

1. **Internal emotional release:** The topic was introduced by a local opinion leader, through messages with high emotional charge.
2. **Rapid takeover of sources affiliated with the malign ecosystem or operating under anonymity:** In a short time, the case was amplified by TV6-Moldova, Canal 5, Gagauznews, KP Moldova, „Ящик Пандоры”/"Pandora's Box", WTF Moldova?! and other channels.
3. **Strengthening the narrative through opinion leaders:** Subsequently, the topic was taken up and commented on by sources compatible with anti-government messages.
4. **External export of the narrative:** The subject was internationalised through REST Media, RT, Margarita Simonyan, the Pravda network and UOJ-America, being presented as evidence that the Republic of Moldova would repeat the "Ukraine scenario".
5. **Amplification on the X platform:** The messages were also distributed to the international public through accounts and influencers used in campaigns associated with the interests of the Russian Federation.



## Method used

The campaign used several manipulation techniques.

The first technique was **to transform a legal dispute into a religious conflict**. The case was taken out of the legal and administrative framework and presented as a confrontation between state and faith.

The second technique was **temporal orchestration of messages**. Malign sources published materials in short intervals, keeping the topic in the public's attention and creating the impression of widespread social outrage.

The third technique was **audience segmentation**. The same incident was presented differently for different audiences:

- for the domestic public, the central message was that "the state attacks the Church and faith";
- for the Russian-speaking public, including from the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the Transnistrian region, the case was framed as "Romanianisation" and an attack against the Orthodox world;
- for the Romanian public, the idea was promoted that the parishioners of the Metropolis of Bessarabia would suffer because of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova;
- for the international public, especially the English-speaking one, the message was that the Republic of Moldova was repeating the "Ukraine scenario".

The fourth technique was **the instrumentalisation of external actors**. Through the involvement of RT, Simonyan, Pravda, REST Media, and UOJ-America, a local incident was transformed into a geopolitical narrative about the alleged persecution of the Orthodox.

The fifth technique was **amplification through inauthentic accounts and influencers**, especially on X, to increase the international visibility of the topic and create the impression that it has global relevance.

## Promoted messages

The main messages promoted were that allegedly:

- the authorities fight against the Church and the faith;
- the police and authorities act against believers;
- the transfer of religious sites to the Metropolis of Bessarabia would represent a form of "Romanianisation";
- the Republic of Moldova would repeat the "Ukraine scenario" in its relationship with the Church;
- pro-European authorities would persecute Orthodox communities;

- the Metropolis of Moldova and the Russian Orthodox Church are under attack by the authorities;
- The Russian Federation would have the role of Orthodox faith "protector".

Depending on the audience, the narrative was adapted in different and contradictory ways. For some audiences, the victims were presented as communities close to the Orthodox Church of Moldova. For other audiences, including in Romania, the message was adjusted to suggest that the parishioners of the Bessarabian Metropolis would suffer. Although the versions were different, the intended effect was the same: to discredit the authorities of the Republic of Moldova and to amplify religious and identity tensions.

### Targeted impact

The campaign aimed, first and foremost, **to delegitimise the government and public order institutions**. By repeating the message that "the state attacks faith," the malicious sources attempted to portray the police and authorities as repressive instruments against parishioners.

Second, the campaign targeted **religious and identity polarisation**. By building an artificial opposition between the Orthodox Church of Moldova and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, the malicious actors attempted to turn a legal dispute into a community fracture.

Third, **the transfer of symbolic authority to the Russian Federation**, indirectly presented as the "protector" of Orthodoxy, was sought. This technique connects a local incident to the geopolitical agenda of the Russian Federation.

Fourth, the campaign aimed **to compromise the European path of the Republic of Moldova**, by associating pro-European governance with religious repression, "Romanianisation" and the Ukrainian scenario.

Ultimately, the campaign aimed **to emotionally mobilise the public**, stimulate indignation, social pressure, and artificially maintain the subject on the public agenda.

### Target audience

The campaign targeted several categories of audience.

**Conservative and religious domestic public**, especially believers attached to the Orthodox Church of Moldova, were exposed to the message that the state would attack religion and religious communities.

**The Russian-speaking public in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the Transnistrian region** was targeted with messages about "Romanianisation", "forced Westernisation" and attacks against the Russian world.

**The public in Romania** was exposed to an adapted version of the narrative, through which the authorities of the Republic of Moldova were presented as incapable or hostile to protecting believers.

**The global audience, especially the English-speaking one on X**, was targeted with the message that the Republic of Moldova would repeat the "Ukraine scenario" to affect the country's external image.

**The pro-Kremlin ecosystem.** It functioned as a space for validation and multiplication. The takeover by RT, Simonyan, Pravda and other similar channels was used to create the impression that the topic had international relevance.

### **Why does it matter?**

This case shows how a local, legal and administrative dispute can be transformed into an information operation with national and external impact.

By exploiting religious emotions, malicious actors have shifted attention from the legal framework of the case to an artificial confrontation between state and faith. This technique is dangerous because religion has a high mobilisation potential, and its manipulation can produce local tensions, distrust in institutions, and identity polarisation.

The dominance of the topic by malicious actors - **91% of all posts analysed** - shows that the Dereanu incident was deliberately captured. Neutral or positive sources had a minority and reactive presence, failing to balance the volume, emotionality and speed of amplification of malicious messages.

### **Conclusion**

The Dereanu incident is a clear example of informational capture of a sensitive topic. Malign actors used a legal dispute over the jurisdiction of a church to build a narrative about “persecution of faith,” “forced Romanianisation,” and “repeating the Ukraine scenario.”

The operational model was staged: emotional launch through internal opinion leaders, amplification through sources affiliated with the malign ecosystem, segmentation of the message by audience, external export through pro-Kremlin actors and pseudo-religious sources, then amplification on X through inauthentic accounts or influencers.

The main risk of this type of campaign is social escalation and the degradation of community cohesion through religious polarisation. The secondary risk is the erosion of trust in the authorities, the police, and the European path of the Republic of Moldova.






Fig. 11. Contracts and total value per institution/beneficiary

The relevance of these connections is enhanced by the fact that VCIOM was previously associated with sociological organisations<sup>22</sup>involved in polling operations of the population of the Republic of Moldova. VCIOM is an institution controlled by the Russian Federation and maintains relations with the "United Russia" party and pro-government media structures in the Russian Federation.

### What did the survey contain?

The survey covered a wide range of sensitive topics. The questions targeted both demographic and socio-political data, as well as topics with high potential for information exploitation (Annex 9):

- resident status of the Republic of Moldova;
- the location, age and profile of the respondent;
- political and electoral preferences;
- the sources of information used;
- attitude towards the EU, NATO, the CIS and the Russian Federation;
- the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova;
- possible reunification with Romania;
- Orthodox Church of Moldova;
- the conflict in the Transnistrian region;
- the war in Ukraine;
- perception towards the authorities of the Republic of Moldova.

<sup>22</sup> [https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/TTP-Raport\\_Interferente-1.pdf](https://stratcom.md/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/TTP-Raport_Interferente-1.pdf), pp. 27-30

The survey included manipulatively formulated questions. For example, respondents were asked how they reacted to events such as the closure of the “Russian House” in Chisinau, the initiation of legal proceedings to withdraw the Republic of Moldova from the CIS, the recommendations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to Russian citizens to avoid travelling to the Republic of Moldova, or the alleged pressure exerted by the authorities on the Orthodox Church in Moldova.

Another question introduced a false premise, suggesting that the President of the Republic of Moldova had made public calls for unification with Romania and for organising a national referendum on the issue. This wording not only measures the respondent's opinion but also introduces a manipulative idea into his mind.

### **Manipulation elements in questions**

The most obvious elements of manipulation appear in questions about the war in Ukraine.

The poll used the phrase “**special military operation**” to describe Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. This wording echoes the Kremlin’s official language and avoids the term *war*.

Other questions offered answer options that shifted responsibility for the conflict to Ukraine, the West, the US, NATO or the EU. For example, respondents were asked who was to blame for bringing the situation in Ukraine to a military conflict, and the options included the US, NATO, the EU, Ukraine and Russia.

In another question, respondents were invited to choose the most realistic option for ending the conflict in Ukraine. The options included the extreme option of “**liquidating Ukraine as an independent state.**” The introduction of such an option in a survey addressed to the public in the Republic of Moldova indicates a clear alignment with the discursive logic hostile to Ukraine and favourable to the Kremlin’s position.

### **Method used**

The operation used a combination of methods.

The first method was **promotion through Russian digital infrastructure**. The survey was distributed through Odnoklassniki, using VKReklama, and redirected users to a Russian domain.

The second method was **sociological coverage**. The survey was presented as an opinion survey, but the structure of the questions went beyond the neutral nature of sociological research.

The third method was **population profiling**. By asking questions about age, location, political preferences, sources of information, and geopolitical orientations, the authors were able to segment respondents based on vulnerabilities, sensitive topics, and receptivity to certain narratives.

The fourth method was **the injection of false premises**. Some questions introduced manipulative or unconfirmed claims, such as alleged calls for unification with Romania or pressure on the Moldovan Orthodox Church.

The fifth method was **to test pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives**. Questions about Ukraine, NATO, the EU, the CIS, neutrality, and the Russian Federation allowed for an assessment of the public's receptivity to Kremlin-aligned messages.

### **What was the purpose of the operation?**

Through this structure, the survey seems to have pursued four objectives simultaneously:

1. **Mapping public opinion** from the Republic of Moldova on sensitive topics, including based on demographic and geographical data.
2. **Audience segmentation** depending on geopolitical, identity, religious and emotional vulnerabilities.
3. **Testing penetration potential** of pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, anti-NATO and anti-Western narratives.
4. **Introducing manipulative messages** directly in the process of completing the survey, through wording that presents false premises or propagandistic language as legitimate response options.

### **Targeted impact**

The main intended impact appears to be the creation of a behavioural and attitudinal database about the public in the Republic of Moldova. Such information can later be used for better calibrated influence campaigns.

By identifying audiences receptive to topics such as neutrality, fear of NATO, attachment to the CIS, distrust of the EU, religious sensitivity, or perceptions about the war in Ukraine, the actors involved can build more precise and effective messages.

At the same time, the survey also has a direct influencing effect. Even if the respondent is not immediately convinced, the mere exposure to formulations such as “special military operation”, “pressure on the Church” or “calls for unification with Romania” can normalise false or manipulative themes.

### **Why does it matter?**

This case shows that information manipulation does not only occur through posts, fake news, or networks of inauthentic accounts. It can also appear in the form of seemingly neutral polls.

Online surveys promoted through infrastructures connected to the Russian Federation can have a dual role: they collect data on citizens and, at the same time, introduce manipulatively formulated questions into the public space. This type of tool can be used to prepare future influence campaigns, tailored to specific audience segments.

Therefore, the risk is related to both data confidentiality and the possibility that respondents will be exposed to messages hostile to the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, the EU or NATO, under the guise of sociological research.

## **Conclusion**

The survey promoted through Odnoklassniki and VKReklama, with redirection to the domain [survey.we-change\[.\]ru](http://survey.we-change[.]ru), does not present the characteristics of a neutral sociological approach. It was conducted through Russian infrastructure, by a company contractually and institutionally connected to the Russian state ecosystem, including VCIOM, ROSPATRIOT, and ministerial structures of the Russian Federation.

The questions included in the survey indicate a dual function: collecting data on the attitudes of the population of the Republic of Moldova and influencing the perceptions of respondents through false premises, propagandistic language, and themes aligned with the Kremlin's discourse.

The case can be assessed as a probing operation with informational influence valences, oriented towards identifying societal vulnerabilities and calibrating future manipulative messages addressed to the public in the Republic of Moldova.

## ANNEX 6: TRANSNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE THAT EXPLOITS THE IMAGE OF OPINION LEADERS FOR WEB TRAFFIC, ADVERTISING AND INFORMATION MANIPULATION

### Context

On 12 May 2026, the Centre identified a network of websites and Facebook pages that exploited the image of opinion leaders from the Republic of Moldova, including the President of the Republic of Moldova, to promote false, alarmist, or misleading articles.

In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the content was distributed through the Facebook page "Stories of Life"<sup>23</sup>, which directed users to the website **thecisclub[.]com**. The articles used sensationalist headlines and images of politicians to attract public attention and generate traffic to the site.

The case is relevant because it highlights a hybrid form of information abuse: the image of public figures is used to create the appearance of political revelations, and the traffic obtained is monetised through advertisements.

### What was observed?

The Facebook page "Stories of Life" presented itself as an entertainment page and had approximately **14 thousand followers**. In its description, it promised "news, current affairs, weather, entertainment and more," but the promoted content included false or exaggerated political articles, designed to generate emotional reactions and clicks.




Fig. 12. Facebook page associated with [https://thecisclub\[.\]com/](https://thecisclub[.]com/)

The headlines used combine real names, images of public figures, and unverified accusations. The goal is not to accurately inform the public, the goal is to attract attention, generate traffic, and induce a perception of permanent political crisis.

### Identified infrastructure

The website **thecisclub[.]com**, which targeted the Moldovan audience, was not an isolated case. It was part of a transnational infrastructure consisting of **83 websites hosted on the same IP 161.35.21.131**, operating in a similar manner and targeting **32 countries**.

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61570984923500>

The network has a predominant focus on Central and Eastern Europe, but also includes important EU states such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The most targeted states are Poland (14 sites), Czech Republic (13 sites), Hungary (11 sites), Bulgaria (8 sites).

These four countries account for almost half of the total number of sites identified, which suggests a strategic targeting of the European space, especially Central and Eastern Europe.

The Republic of Moldova was targeted through [thecisclub.com](https://thecisclub.com), associated with the Facebook page "Stories of Life".



Fig. 13. The site targeting the RM  
<https://thecisclub.com>

### Investigative indicators of coordination

The network presented several technical and operational indicators showing joint or coordinated management.

The first indicator is the technical infrastructure. The identified sites were associated with the same IP 161.35.21.131 infrastructure block, and the website targeting the Republic of Moldova was part of this network. The shared hosting and similar functioning of the sites indicate that they do not operate independently.

The second indicator is the use of GA4 tracking codes for the sites in the network. The presence of these codes shows that traffic was being systematically tracked, which supports the hypothesis of an infrastructure oriented towards performance measurement, audience optimisation, and monetising.

The third indicator is the connection to Facebook. Most of the 83 websites had a dedicated Facebook page, used to distribute articles to the target country audience. In some cases, several sites shared the same Facebook account, indicating joint management (the list of associated accounts and sites can be found in Annex 10).




Fig. 14. Manipulative content monetising model through traffic and ads

The fourth indicator is the use of the same social accounts for the entire network. All the sites analysed used the same **X**<sup>24</sup>, **LinkedIn**<sup>25</sup> and **Instagram**<sup>26</sup> accounts associated with the **Hayly Marketing entity**<sup>27</sup>. This overlap is an important element because it connects the infrastructure of sites to a presumed common operator.

The fifth indicator is monetising. The sites contained a high volume of advertisements, which indicates a simple operational mechanism, see Fig. 14.

### Hayly Marketing and the possible cover identity

The network's shared social accounts were associated with **Hayly Marketing**, which was presented as an Armenian marketing company based in Yerevan. The company's website featured a team led by **Aghasi Mesropyan**,




Fig. 15. The alleged public team of Hayly Marketing

**Mesropyan**, who was presented as the founder and CEO.

The publicly displayed team also included **Hasmik Minasyan**, **Hasmik Harutyunyan**, **Vardine Petrosyan**, **Liana Asatryan**, **Emma Poghosyan** and **Syuzi Petrosyan**.

However, the analysis identified several problematic elements:

- the images of four team members - **Vardine Petrosyan**, **Liana Asatryan**, **Emma Poghosyan** and **Syuzi Petrosyan** - present visual characteristics specific to content generated through artificial intelligence;
- none of the individuals identified on the site, including Aghasi Mesropyan, have a verifiable association with Hayly Marketing on their public LinkedIn profiles;
- The domain **hayly[.]jam** is registered through the Armenian registrar **ABCDomain LLC**<sup>28</sup>, starting May 24, 2023;
- the director of the registrar is Grigori Saghyan;
- Hayly Marketing migrated over time through several IP addresses: **178.128.204.247** in 2021, **161.97.94.13** in 2023, **5.101.153.220** in 2024, and later the Cloudflare infrastructure.

<sup>24</sup> [x.com/mastersblogging](https://x.com/mastersblogging)

<sup>25</sup> [linkedin.com/company/hayly-am/](https://linkedin.com/company/hayly-am/)

<sup>26</sup> [instagram.com/hayly\\_marketing/](https://instagram.com/hayly_marketing/)

<sup>27</sup> [https://hayly\[.\]jam/](https://hayly[.]jam/)


<sup>28</sup> [https://internet\[.\]jam/](https://internet[.]jam/)

These elements suggest that Hayly Marketing could function as a cover identity, built to provide the appearance of legitimacy to a network of sites with manipulative and commercial activity.

### Method used

The network used a repetitive, scalable and country-adapted method.


**The first stage was masking the real operator.** The network was presented as being associated with an apparently legitimate marketing entity, Hayly Marketing, but several indicators raise questions about its authenticity: the use of images with characteristics specific to AI-generated content, the lack of verifiable associations between the people featured on the site and the company, as well as the shared technical infrastructure used by the network of websites.



**The second stage was the creation of seemingly local websites;** each aimed at a specific country's audience. These sites had different names, but similar structures, similar templates, and the same content model.

**The third stage was the association with dedicated Facebook pages,** through which the articles were distributed to the targeted national audience. In the case of the Republic of Moldova, this role was fulfilled by the "Stories from Life" page.

**The fourth stage was the exploitation of the image of political figures.** The names and photos of political leaders were used for headlines about scandals, corruption, betrayal, political crises, or foreign interference.



**The fifth stage was directing users to sites loaded with ads.** With each click, operators obtained traffic that could be monetised. Thus, information manipulation was combined with a commercial mechanism for generating advertising revenue.

### Promoted messages

In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the content exploited sensitive political themes:

- corruption;
- betrayal;
- political crises;
- alleged foreign interference in the elections;
- scandals attributed to political figures;
- political instability;
- unverified accusations against publicly visible leaders.

Instead of being tackled journalistically, these topics were used to capture attention and direct users to the site. The content was built for quick reaction, not information.

### Targeted impact

The network appears to be pursuing two simultaneous goals.

The first goal is **to generate profit**. Through sensational headlines, political images, and sharing on Facebook, operators attract users to sites loaded with ads. Traffic thus becomes a source of income.

The second objective is **information manipulation**. Even if the financial motivation seems important, the effect on the public is informational: citizens are exposed to false or misleading articles, which can fuel distrust, confusion and the perception that the political scene is dominated by permanent scandals.

In the Republic of Moldova, this type of content can contribute to:

- the degradation of trust in political leaders;
- trivialising false accusations;
- increasing cynicism towards institutions;
- weakening the public's ability to distinguish between real news and manipulative content;
- artificial amplification of political themes.

### Why does it matter?

This case shows that information manipulation is not always motivated exclusively by politics or geopolitical interests. Sometimes it is combined with commercial interests. Clickbait networks can use lies, scandals and the image of political leaders to profit from advertising.

However, the fact that the motivation may be financial does not reduce the risk. An already functional infrastructure, with websites, Facebook pages, social accounts and monetising mechanisms, can be quickly adapted to promote hostile narratives, reputation attacks or influence campaigns.

The transnational nature of the network - **83 sites in 32 countries** - shows that it is not a local or accidental case, but a scaled infrastructure, capable of exploiting different national audiences through the same methodology.

## Conclusion

The analysed network represents an example of coordinated exploitation of the image of political figures for profit and information manipulation. In the Republic of Moldova, the page "**Stories from Life**" and the website **thecisclub[.]com** were used to promote false or sensationalist articles about political figures.

The **83 sites** targeting **32 countries**, the shared infrastructure associated with the IP block **161.35.21.131**, the use of **GA4** tracking codes, dedicated Facebook pages, shared social accounts, and the association with Hayly Marketing indicate the existence of a coordinated network.

Hayly Marketing appears to be operating as a front identity for this infrastructure. Evidence of the use of AI-generated images, the lack of verifiable LinkedIn associations, and the migration of technical infrastructure suggest that the operator's corporate identity may be fabricated to mask the real administration of the network.

The case confirms that information manipulation can be combined with monetising through advertising, and the final effect is twofold: profit for operators and contamination of the information space with false, alarmist, or misleading articles.

## ANNEX 7: USE OF EUROPEAN PUBLICATIONS WITH PRO-RUSSIAN AFFILIATIONS TO LEGITIMISE ANTI-GOVERNMENTAL MESSAGES ABOUT THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

### Context

In April 2026, the French publication **Omerta** published several materials about the Republic of Moldova, including interviews with local opinion leaders. The case is relevant because it illustrates a recurring technique of influence: placing anti-government messages in an apparently credible Western source, so that they are later reintroduced into the domestic information space as “opinions from the West” or “assessments of the French press.”

The published materials presented the Republic of Moldova as a “playground” for external actors, a “geopolitical laboratory” of EU interference in internal affairs, and a state controlled by “globalists,” Soros, or other Western centres of influence. At the same time, the authorities in Chisinau were described in terms such as “mafia” and “organised crime,” without compelling factual grounds.

### What was observed?

Although *Omerta* presents itself as a French magazine, the publication's profile raises several questions. The publication appeared in 2022, shortly after RT France was banned in the European space.

One of the publication's founders, **Régis Le Sommer**, was previously a senior reporter for **Russia Today France**<sup>30</sup>, an internationally sanctioned entity<sup>31</sup> and a subsidiary of Russia Today. RT was in turn founded by the Russian state agency **RIA Novosti**, which indicates a relevant connection between the magazine's founders and the state media infrastructure of the Russian Federation.

In France, the network of fake Facebook pages was also used to amplify tweets by Florian Philippot, Marine Le Pen's ex-right arm, on the war in Ukraine, or a video by the French media outlet **Omerta**, which defends pro-Russian positions. On Twitter, Doppelgänger accounts were also regularly used to suggest that figures close to the Kremlin read fake articles created by the operation. For example, Yves Pozzo di Borgo, a former senator and staunch supporter of Russia, reposted a fake article from *Le Parisien* claiming that Ukrainians were deserting in droves. In France, the Facebook ads broadcast by the operation since February 2023 have garnered almost 3 million views, according to the social network's estimates.

**Fig.18. Le Monde on the instrumentalisation of the Omerta publication by networks of fake accounts on social networks.**<sup>29</sup>

Another key player is **Charles d'Anjou**, the sole shareholder of **Nordman Medias**, which fully owns *Omerta* magazine. According to the analysed data, he gave an interview to **Zvezda**, the media channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and appears in a 2018 photo with **Serghey Lavrov**. In 2023, d'Anjou was living in Moscow and working as an advisor to a Russian security group led by a former FSB employee, identified in open sources as Vasily Verechtchak.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> <https://archive.ph/of6GO#selection-2121.0-2121.236>

<sup>30</sup> <https://archive.ph/QdTIh>

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-YaBT55deyV2Auvu8ktCrR6/>

<sup>32</sup> [https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2023/01/14/en-france-la-contre-offensive-des-medias-prorusses\\_6157840\\_4500055.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2023/01/14/en-france-la-contre-offensive-des-medias-prorusses_6157840_4500055.html)

These elements are important because they show that Omerta is not just a French publication with critical opinions, but a platform with documented links to individuals and media associated with the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the magazine was previously promoted by the Russian disinformation campaign **Doppelgänger**, which indicates its integration into information circuits used to amplify messages favourable to the Kremlin (see Fig. 18).

### **Promoted content about the Republic of Moldova**

The Omerta materials promoted several narratives consistent with the recurring lines of pro-Kremlin propaganda. One of the articles suggested that the electoral victory of the President of the Republic of Moldova was politically “fabricated” and that the 2025 parliamentary elections were “shadowed by American interference.” At the same time, the article claimed that Europe had “taken control” after the closure of USAID, using as an argument the visits of European officials to Chisinau and the financial assistance offered to the Republic of Moldova for the period 2025-2027.

An important feature of these materials is the unbalanced selection of facts. They emphasise alleged Western interference but omit the documented interference of the Russian Federation in the electoral and information processes in the Republic of Moldova, including vote-buying and disinformation campaigns directed against the country's European path.

Other materials promoted the idea that television stations would be closed, the press would be kept under strict control, and political opponents would be subjected to judicial harassment and intimidation. These formulations are like narratives frequently used to present the Republic of Moldova as an authoritarian state and to delegitimise measures taken against disinformation, illegal financing, or actors involved in hostile activities.

### **How the case was promoted**

After the materials were published, the content was promoted in the information space of the Republic of Moldova. In some posts, files stored via Google Drive were distributed, including the full edition of the magazine and translations into Romanian and Russian.

During 19-20 April, the ideas published by Omerta were amplified through dozens of posts and videos on multiple platforms. The amplification involved Facebook pages and accounts, including anonymous ones, internet users who frequently share fakes and manipulations, sources known for information manipulation, and TikTok accounts.

Among the sources that contributed to the spread of messages were platforms such as **Komsomolskaya Pravda v Moldove**<sup>33</sup>, **Canal 5**<sup>34</sup>, **WTF Moldova?!**<sup>35</sup>, **"Первый в Молдове"**

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<sup>33</sup> <https://t.me/KpMoldova/136694>

<sup>34</sup> <https://t.me/canal5ru/62425>

<sup>35</sup> <https://t.me/wtfmoldovachat/1366666>


Новости<sup>36</sup>, Мир Гагаузии. Новости Молдовы<sup>37</sup>, PRAVDA MD<sup>38</sup>. The content was also picked up on TikTok, particularly through anonymous channels.

An important element is the exaggeration of the publication's status. Some sources presented the materials as coming from "French media sources" in general, while some accounts used formulas such as "France abolished the Sandu regime". Thus, a material published in a marginal magazine was artificially transformed into an alleged position of the French press or even France.

## Method used

The case illustrates a technique of **external validation** or "information washing." Messages are placed in a Western publication, then promoted in the Republic of Moldova as evidence that the "French press" or "the West" would confirm the accusations against the authorities.

The mechanism worked in several stages (Fig.19):



## Promoted messages

The main narrative lines identified are:

- The Republic of Moldova would be administered from outside;
- The authorities in Chisinau are allegedly controlled by "globalists", Soros, the EU or other Western centres;
- The Republic of Moldova would be a "geopolitical laboratory" of Western intervention;
- The authorities would be a "mafia" or a form of "organised crime";
- The elections were allegedly influenced or controlled from outside by Western actors;
- The press would be controlled, and the opposition would be persecuted;

<sup>36</sup> <https://t.me/primulinmd/115101>

<sup>37</sup> <https://t.me/mirgagauzia/13623>

<sup>38</sup> <https://t.me/pravdamdcom/43976>

- The European path would mean the loss of sovereignty.

These messages are not presented as Russian propaganda but are packaged in a Western format. This packaging makes them easier for reuse later by local actors, pseudo-media, and propaganda channels.

### **The risk of instrumentalisation of internal actors**

The participation of public actors from the Republic of Moldova in such platforms does not automatically imply conscious coordination with hostile networks. In practice, they may simply seek a communication platform to convey their messages to external audiences, including the diaspora or Western audiences.

The risk arises when these seemingly Western platforms are connected to information ecosystems with a pro-Russian or anti-system orientation. In such situations, opinions, criticism or messages formulated by local actors can be selected, translated, redistributed and instrumentalised to harm the image of the Republic of Moldova.

Thus, even without the conscious participation of domestic actors in an influence operation, their messages can be used to validate and amplify hostile narratives, to create the impression that accusations against the state are confirmed by "Western sources" and to fuel distrust in the institutions of the Republic of Moldova.

The main issue is not only the content of the interviews, but also **the choice of communication platform**. When politicians, opinion leaders or other public actors do not critically assess the reputation, connections and history of the media in which they appear, their messages can be integrated into influence campaigns that affect state interests.

An additional reputational risk for domestic actors who agree to collaborate with such publications is that they may consider the platform a credible Western source or an opportunity to communicate with external audiences. However, appearing in an environment connected to pro-Russian ecosystems can become problematic when the audience learns who is really behind the publication, what the founders are like, what connections the magazine has, and how its materials have been used previously.

In such situations, actors who have provided interviews or materials may suffer image damage, being perceived as negligent in their choice of communication platforms or even as participants, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the legitimisation of hostile information environments. Thus, the failure to verify the reputation of a foreign publication may affect not only the interests of the state, but also the public credibility of those who choose to communicate through it.

## Targeted impact

The intended impact is twofold: internal and external.

Domestically, these materials can be used to validate narratives already present in the local information ecosystem. The fact that the messages appear in a Western publication allows local actors to present them as confirmations coming from the “French press”, even if the source has a problematic ideological and informational profile.




Fig.20. Promotion of Omerta by the Telegram channel network

Externally, the publication of anti-government messages about the Republic of Moldova in a French magazine with pro-Russian connections may harm the country's image in the eyes of the

French public, the Moldovan diaspora in France, and other European audiences. The message conveyed is that the Republic of Moldova is a state controlled by foreign interests, unstable, lacking political autonomy, or incapable of respecting European democratic standards.

This type of promotion can also have negative effects **on the European path of the Republic of Moldova**. Through repeated reputational blows in the European information space, such materials can fuel false perceptions about the state's ability to advance reforms, protect democratic processes and act as a credible partner of the EU. Over time, these narratives can be used to reduce the European public's trust in the EU's enlargement towards the Republic of Moldova and to create informational pressure for European decision-makers.

In the longer term, the case may contribute to the erosion of trust in Moldova's institutions, in its partnership with the West, as well as in the country's European direction. It may also fuel the perception that state measures against foreign interference, illegal financing, or disinformation are merely instruments of political repression.

### Why does it matter?

This case shows how a Western publication with a problematic profile can be used to lend credibility to hostile messages about the Republic of Moldova. For the public, the label "French magazine" can create the impression of an independent external assessment, even if the publication has documented connections to pro-Russian information ecosystems.

The risk is not limited to published content. Political or public actors from the Republic of Moldova may accept to appear on such platforms without knowing in detail who is behind them, out of a desire to communicate with the external public or the diaspora. However, once published, their messages may be selected, translated and redistributed by platforms or networks that seek to affect the image of the Republic of Moldova.

Collaborating with such platforms can also generate reputational costs for domestic actors, especially when their audience later learns that the publication, presented as a credible Western source, has connections to pro-Russian information ecosystems or disinformation campaigns.

That is why the choice of communication platform is important. The lack of a critical check of a publication's reputation, connections and history can transform a seemingly ordinary media appearance into a tool of influence against state interests and into a reputational vulnerability for actors who agree to communicate through such channels.

### Conclusion

The Omerta case illustrates the mechanism of **external validation of hostile narratives**: anti-government messages about the Republic of Moldova are placed in a Western publication with pro-Russian connections, then reintroduced into the domestic information space as alleged confirmations coming from the French press.

The materials promoted ideas compatible with the narrative lines of pro-Kremlin ecosystems: the Republic of Moldova would be controlled from outside, the authorities would act against the

national interest, and the European path would mean the loss of sovereignty. At the same time, the context regarding the publication's profile and its connections is omitted or minimised in the promotion process.

The case **highlights the need for public actors in the Republic of Moldova to be more cautious in choosing external communication platforms.** Even when the intention is only to convey a message to the international public, appearing in an information environment which is opaque or connected to hostile ecosystems can be instrumentalised to harm the image of the state, affect the credibility of the actors involved and produce reputational blows against the Republic of Moldova in the European information space.

## ANNEX 8: NETWORK OF INAUTHENTIC ACCOUNTS ON FACEBOOK

No.	Name Surname	Account link:	Date of creation / operationalisation
1	Liliana Coșei	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578533693688">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578533693688</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/LCyGA">https://archive.ph/wip/LCyGA</a>	12 iunie 2025 9 feb
2	Marinica Ceban	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582754873153">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582754873153</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/uDfq8">https://archive.ph/wip/uDfq8</a>	7 mar 2026
3	Viorel Gîrlea	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576675603056">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576675603056</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/P5VNI">https://archive.ph/wip/P5VNI</a>	1 jun 2025
4	Леонард Гуцу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577860286563">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577860286563</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/ZMBYj">https://archive.ph/wip/ZMBYj</a>	25 jun 2025
5	Petru Vicol	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581443757954">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581443757954</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/lfikT">https://archive.ph/wip/lfikT</a>	25 sept 2025
6	Adrian Braga	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577397864672">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577397864672</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/h7jiQ">https://archive.ph/wip/h7jiQ</a>	12 iunie 2025 9 feb
7	Adrian Păduraru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577692445278">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577692445278</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/Ar0Dj">https://archive.ph/wip/Ar0Dj</a>	25 jun 2025
8	Ирина Ротарь	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583676555850">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583676555850</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/ip2na">https://archive.ph/wip/ip2na</a>	21 noi 2025
9	Adriana Mocușu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581466843654">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581466843654</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/CP313">https://archive.ph/wip/CP313</a>	3 oct 2025
10	Agafia Vicol	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581420015824">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581420015824</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/mTpuj">https://archive.ph/wip/mTpuj</a>	
11	Alexandra Rotaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577605110239">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577605110239</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/6Wlfx">https://archive.ph/wip/6Wlfx</a>	19 jun 2025
12	Aleynanur Mișu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580923954809">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580923954809</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/Fd6ON">https://archive.ph/wip/Fd6ON</a>	17 sept 2025 24 feb
13	Angela Barbu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583729607358">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583729607358</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/8jUNG">https://archive.ph/wip/8jUNG</a>	7 mar 2025
14	Aurel Hucu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577427084853">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577427084853</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/XyN9j">https://archive.ph/wip/XyN9j</a>	13 iunie 2025 18 dec
15	Cristina Gonciar	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584100287663">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584100287663</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/hYPvb">https://archive.ph/wip/hYPvb</a>	20 nov 2025 5 dec
17	Novac Gheorghe	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580859938964">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580859938964</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/oxwDH">https://archive.ph/oxwDH</a>	17 sept 2025
18	Андрей Корнев	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584677150687">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584677150687</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/7ydoF">https://archive.ph/wip/7ydoF</a>	30 nov 2025
19	София Флораш	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580887057027">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580887057027</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/3nzt">https://archive.ph/wip/3nzt</a>	17 sept 2025
20	Домника Киркэ	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577575240052&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577575240052&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/oQfH3">https://archive.ph/wip/oQfH3</a>	25 iun 2025
21	Domnica Sarabulescu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580918884077">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580918884077</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/BPabs">https://archive.ph/wip/BPabs</a>	16 sept 2025 18 sept 2025
22	Dorinaș Rădulescuț	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585628937175">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585628937175</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/zJP94">https://archive.ph/zJP94</a>	23 dec 2025
23	Dumitru Balan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580665685763">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580665685763</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/71bJk">https://archive.ph/wip/71bJk</a>	14 sept 2025
24	Valeriu Spînu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577065043967&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577065043967&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/4TcHf">https://archive.ph/4TcHf</a>	1 iun 2025
25	Melisa Munteanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579761611655&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579761611655&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/vqJjF">https://archive.ph/vqJjF</a>	29 aug 2025
26	Ева Цуркану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580719600830&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580719600830&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/aAwJm">https://archive.ph/aAwJm</a>	17 sept

No.	Name Surname	Account link:	Date of creation / operationalisation
27	Angela Barbu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583729607358&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583729607358&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/8jUNG">https://archive.ph/wip/8jUNG</a>	7 mar 2026
28	Ecaterina Rotaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584178943489">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584178943489</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/i3fYY">https://archive.ph/wip/i3fYY</a>	20 nov 2025
29	Elisabetaș Turcanuș	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585667755492">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585667755492</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/gXVXA">https://archive.ph/wip/gXVXA</a>	23 dec 2025
30	Emily Dragu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581551559079">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581551559079</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/QhWxx">https://archive.ph/wip/QhWxx</a>	3 oct 2025
31	Luminița Munteanuș	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585630347104&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585630347104&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/01hHP">https://archive.ph/wip/01hHP</a>	23 dec 2025
32	Florinaș Lupuș	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585445525756&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585445525756&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/BnXjt">https://archive.ph/wip/BnXjt</a>	23 dec 2025
33	Eugen Colibășanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577153436334">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577153436334</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/YVXhr">https://archive.ph/wip/YVXhr</a>	12 jun 2025
34	Fevronia Ciubotaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581507491086">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581507491086</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/JIYtn">https://archive.ph/wip/JIYtn</a>	3 oct 2025
35	Izabella Lyngy	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585647296351">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585647296351</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/6xjQE">https://archive.ph/wip/6xjQE</a>	23 dec 2025
36	Janna Jaman	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577040235375">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577040235375</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/RDkCA">https://archive.ph/RDkCA</a>	1 iun 2025
37	Kiril Mercus	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582854722815">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582854722815</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/d8FZR">https://archive.ph/d8FZR</a>	26 oct 2025 15 jan 2026
38	Kristina Tudor	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585449392825">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585449392825</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/oR1a9">https://archive.ph/oR1a9</a>	21 dec 2025
39	Larisa Rotaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581529630323">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581529630323</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/nPmas">https://archive.ph/nPmas</a>	3 oct 2025
40	Maria Găină	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581444464446">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581444464446</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/zBmmr">https://archive.ph/zBmmr</a>	3 oct 2025
41	Maruya Spotary	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576672183478">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576672183478</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/V6HJI">https://archive.ph/V6HJI</a>	1 jun 2025
42	Melisa Munteanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579761611655">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579761611655</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/vqIjF">https://archive.ph/vqIjF</a>	29 aug 2025
43	Мокану Виктория	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581166014021&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581166014021&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/BpluT">https://archive.ph/BpluT</a>	17 sept 2025
44	Нина Кодряну	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577621942749&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577621942749&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/rf4gT">https://archive.ph/rf4gT</a>	21 iun 2025
45	Ани Илиеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577580211338">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577580211338</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/ON4ER">https://archive.ph/wip/ON4ER</a>	19 iun 2025
46	Ilie Ursu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582686525713&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582686525713&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/MIKDt">https://archive.ph/wip/MIKDt</a>	29 oct 2025
47	Vasilina Țора	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577042502059&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577042502059&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/Xr5OL">https://archive.ph/wip/Xr5OL</a>	12 iun 2025
48	Natalia Ciobanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583867288198">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583867288198</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/hR7aE">https://archive.ph/wip/hR7aE</a>	20 nov 2025
49	Александр Мунтяну	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577105080517">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577105080517</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/DkNxe">https://archive.ph/DkNxe</a>	13 iun 2025
50	Olesea Damian	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585716835751">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585716835751</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/6oP21">https://archive.ph/wip/6oP21</a>	24 dec 2025
51	Olga Ciocîrlan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577365945209">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577365945209</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/DDwBA">https://archive.ph/wip/DDwBA</a>	11 iun 2025
52	Petru Melnic	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583894463159">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583894463159</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/Avxzy">https://archive.ph/Avxzy</a>	18 nov 2025

No.	Name Surname	Account link:	Date of creation / operationalisation
53	Katerina Lupu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585532942332">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585532942332</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/9Px9s">https://archive.ph/wip/9Px9s</a>	23 dec 2025
54	Rita Rotari	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576687392135">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576687392135</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/xnyxq">https://archive.ph/xnyxq</a>	31 may 2025
55	Veronica Grosu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576628684690">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576628684690</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/W0RcX">https://archive.ph/W0RcX</a>	31 may 2025
56	Визирь Виктория	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577262992840">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577262992840</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/7gwXs">https://archive.ph/7gwXs</a>	13 iun 2025
57	Rodica Melnic	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584884342752">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584884342752</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/FxSwI">https://archive.ph/FxSwI</a>	7 mar 2026
58	Sebastian Țărnă	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577719922872">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577719922872</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/Dsyvk">https://archive.ph/Dsyvk</a>	24 iun 2025
59	Soltanici Ludmila	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577222914658">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577222914658</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/bJT4A">https://archive.ph/bJT4A</a>	13 iun 2025 18 dec 2025
60	Sorin Vutcărau	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581425955458">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581425955458</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/xcAra">https://archive.ph/xcAra</a>	3 oct 2025
61	Sovagiu Țurcan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577661485862">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577661485862</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/GTgBL">https://archive.ph/GTgBL</a>	25 iun 2025
62	Svetlana Stratan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576971208712">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576971208712</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/rZhnH">https://archive.ph/rZhnH</a>	1 jun 2025
63	Tania Gălățeanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577326498034">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577326498034</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/MpiJA">https://archive.ph/MpiJA</a>	12 iun 2025 10 feb 2026
64	Tanya Ciobanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576974869345">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576974869345</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/TRY6a">https://archive.ph/TRY6a</a>	1 jun 2025 12 ian 2026
65	Valeriu Toma	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583638693969">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583638693969</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/gv0f4">https://archive.ph/gv0f4</a>	19 nov 2025 1 dec 2025
66	Veronica Toma	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583638244307">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583638244307</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/C1ID1">https://archive.ph/C1ID1</a>	19 nov 2025
67	Victor Lungu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579418213867">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579418213867</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/AV1BX">https://archive.ph/wip/AV1BX</a>	11 aug 2025
68	Victoria Popescu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582787415487">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582787415487</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/yQHAz">https://archive.ph/wip/yQHAz</a>	30 oct 2025
69	Victoria Purcica	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581172613745">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581172613745</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/jWImv">https://archive.ph/wip/jWImv</a>	17 sept 2025
70	Vioricața Bîrsan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585489113427">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585489113427</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/uF3xN">https://archive.ph/uF3xN</a>	23 dec 2025
71	Zlata Burca	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581429255055">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581429255055</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/sAJwp">https://archive.ph/sAJwp</a>	3 oct 2025
72	Адам Чобану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577430552032">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577430552032</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/Dj4HH">https://archive.ph/wip/Dj4HH</a>	25 iun 2025
73	Александра Цуркан	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577242087613">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577242087613</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/BeKGj">https://archive.ph/BeKGj</a>	16 iun 2025
74	Алина Туркану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584445562420">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584445562420</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/YMK4h">https://archive.ph/wip/YMK4h</a>	30 nov 2025
75	Артур Балан	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581632825654">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581632825654</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/9v6fz">https://archive.ph/wip/9v6fz</a>	3 oct 2025
76	Эмма Сырбу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577334615876">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577334615876</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/IP6Pw">https://archive.ph/wip/IP6Pw</a>	25 jun 2025
77	Феличия Райлян	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577386590632">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577386590632</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/GKMN8">https://archive.ph/GKMN8</a>	16 jun 2025
78	Серджиу Дэнеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577613097731">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577613097731</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/f4Nn5">https://archive.ph/wip/f4Nn5</a>	25 jun 2025

No.	Name Surname	Account link:	Date of creation / operationalisation
79	Руксанда Чобану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577333984892">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577333984892</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/Cz8Lm">https://archive.ph/wip/Cz8Lm</a>	24 jun 2025
80	Роберт Кожокаръ	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581489762538">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581489762538</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/nF9xi">https://archive.ph/nF9xi</a>	3 oct 2025
81	Марин Маринеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577284990839">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577284990839</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/VXu6y">https://archive.ph/VXu6y</a>	19 jun 2025
82	Лукрециу Теодореску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577924933556">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577924933556</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/R72GW">https://archive.ph/R72GW</a>	25 jun 2025
83	Лука Кодряну	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578000260032">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578000260032</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/LwSZC">https://archive.ph/LwSZC</a>	25 jun 2025
84	Лилия Долганюк	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577215565299">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577215565299</a>	13 jun 2025
85	Иосиф Монтян	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577354924275">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577354924275</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/FgUVs">https://archive.ph/FgUVs</a>	24 jun 2025
86	Йоан Джордже	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577215565299">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577215565299</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/OJBh2">https://archive.ph/OJBh2</a>	13 jun 2025
87	Виктория Балану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577951692219">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577951692219</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/RE4IR">https://archive.ph/RE4IR</a>	25 jun 2025
88	Валериян Маринеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577696133146">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577696133146</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/uQiOw">https://archive.ph/wip/uQiOw</a>	24 jun 2025
89	Валериан Гика	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577169731893">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577169731893</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/sKYM8">https://archive.ph/wip/sKYM8</a>	16 jun 2025
90	Антон Гросу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584299859338">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584299859338</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/dQZy4">https://archive.ph/dQZy4</a>	30 nov 2025
91	Александра Чаушеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577628808088">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577628808088</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/bLFXG">https://archive.ph/bLFXG</a>	18 jun 2025
92	Александра Чаушеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577425053707">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577425053707</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/yg0UX">https://archive.ph/yg0UX</a>	19 jun 2025
93	Никита Рэдулеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577682335076">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577682335076</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/I016f">https://archive.ph/I016f</a>	25 jun 2025
94	Artur Cernat	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577246981843">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577246981843</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/FSm4a">https://archive.ph/FSm4a</a>	19 jun 2025
95	Богдан Цуркану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581681063253">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581681063253</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/OO7iq">https://archive.ph/OO7iq</a>	3 oct 2025
96	Гаврил Ткач	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577837787642">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577837787642</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/Xs8sk">https://archive.ph/Xs8sk</a>	25 iun 2025
97	Давид Боцан	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580919156308">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580919156308</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/vKt1A">https://archive.ph/vKt1A</a>	17 sept 2025
98	Датоян Кристина	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581434895623">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581434895623</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/Eovbu">https://archive.ph/Eovbu</a>	3 oct 2025
99	Ева Цуркану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580719600830">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580719600830</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/aAwJm">https://archive.ph/aAwJm</a>	17 sept 2025
100	Екатерина Чобану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583919720112">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583919720112</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/mFfZH">https://archive.ph/mFfZH</a>	7 mar 2026
101	Ирина Кушнир	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584204292374">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584204292374</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wip/H7Wmh">https://archive.ph/wip/H7Wmh</a>	20 nov 2025
102	Лариса Дудец	<a href="http://facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584111824308">http://facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584111824308</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/QLXwb">https://archive.ph/QLXwb</a>	
103	Лариса Гуцул	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585644956300">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585644956300</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/mcDct">https://archive.ph/mcDct</a>	12 ian 2026
104	Лилия Балан	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577590137775">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577590137775</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/IHYzK">https://archive.ph/IHYzK</a>	19 iun 2025

No.	Name Surname	Account link:	Date of creation / operationalisation
105	Людмила Петрик	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584406504187">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584406504187</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/fWE8j">https://archive.ph/fWE8j</a>	30 nov 2025
106	Мокану Виктория	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581166014021">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581166014021</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/BpluT">https://archive.ph/BpluT</a>	17 sept 2025
107	Мокану Нику	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577011107453">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577011107453</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/9GG39">https://archive.ph/9GG39</a>	1 iun 2025
108	Николай Гросу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577293050650">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577293050650</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/I0HD6">https://archive.ph/I0HD6</a>	21 jun 2025
109	Оксана Гришка	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584302229094">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584302229094</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/EP3Bk">https://archive.ph/EP3Bk</a>	30 nov 2025
110	Петру Гика	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577308964953">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577308964953</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/qYJnX">https://archive.ph/qYJnX</a>	23 iun 2025
111	Lilia Madan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585479246953">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585479246953</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/yz5xa">https://archive.ph/yz5xa</a>	24 dec 2025 18 ian 2026
112	Rareş Drăgansea	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576829765531">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576829765531</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/U5qUr">https://archive.ph/U5qUr</a>	31 mai 2025
113	Чабан Кирилл	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585615857755">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585615857755</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/3Jr4l">https://archive.ph/3Jr4l</a>	22 dec 2025
114	Димитрие Кэлинеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577285170739">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577285170739</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/OPsQh">https://archive.ph/OPsQh</a>	19 iun 2025
115	Alexandru Bejenaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584363008996">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584363008996</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/tFvx3">https://archive.ph/tFvx3</a>	1 dec 2025
116	Alina Balan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581453283931">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581453283931</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/dgev4">https://archive.ph/dgev4</a>	3 oct 2025
117	Constance Wright	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584200992952">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584200992952</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/zbxFS">https://archive.ph/zbxFS</a>	20 noi 2025
118	Diana Lungu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584309998705">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584309998705</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/4kUc3">https://archive.ph/4kUc3</a>	30 nov 2025 22 dec 2025
119	Domnica Prisacaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580823368173">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580823368173</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/cYVvMx">https://archive.ph/cYVvMx</a>	3 oct 2025
120	Inna Rotar	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578562284815&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578562284815&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/zugKe">https://archive.ph/zugKe</a>	14 iul 2025
121	Elena Seban	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585642499429&amp;sk=about">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585642499429&amp;sk=about</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/4DDhp">https://archive.ph/4DDhp</a>	24 dec 2025
122	Helena Hmara	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577014376965">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577014376965</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/ekjr0">https://archive.ph/ekjr0</a>	1 iun 2025
123	Maria Popescu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581791036728">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581791036728</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/zMZOa">https://archive.ph/zMZOa</a>	3 oct 2025
124	Natalia Cojocaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581882472130">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581882472130</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/S1S19">https://archive.ph/S1S19</a>	3 oct 2025
125	Natalia Ionescu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585395941271">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585395941271</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/vCILQ">https://archive.ph/vCILQ</a>	25 dec 2025
126	Leonid Mihay	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576703742959">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576703742959</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/sumJJ">https://archive.ph/sumJJ</a>	1 jun 2025
127	Irina Popa	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585583852514">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585583852514</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/OZH60">https://archive.ph/OZH60</a>	24 dec 2025
128	Cristina Munteanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585362402907">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585362402907</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/asotA">https://archive.ph/asotA</a>	24 dec 2025
129	Daniel Bechir	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581360361034">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581360361034</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/IJJ2Q">https://archive.ph/IJJ2Q</a>	24 sept 2025
130	Валя Флоря	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582837958134">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582837958134</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/r29RK">https://archive.ph/r29RK</a>	25 oct 2025

No.	Name Surname	Account link:	Date of creation / operationalisation
131	Florica Cantemir	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584206394460">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584206394460</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/b6vCZ">https://archive.ph/b6vCZ</a>	21 nov 2025
132	Daci Leu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583904728227">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583904728227</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/YfbpC">https://archive.ph/YfbpC</a>	21 nov 2025
133	Ion Glavan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583801230319">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583801230319</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/KnRcf">https://archive.ph/KnRcf</a>	19 nov 2025
134	Constantin Glavan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581882472130">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581882472130</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/S1S19">https://archive.ph/S1S19</a>	12 jun 2025
135	Grosu Viorica	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581551229178">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581551229178</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/QWykL">https://archive.ph/QWykL</a>	3 oct 2025
136	Кристина Казаку	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581632135549">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581632135549</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/C5d7o">https://archive.ph/C5d7o</a>	3 oct 2025
137	Адреана Лупеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583927527529">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583927527529</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/m8zSD">https://archive.ph/m8zSD</a>	21 nov 2025
138	Elena Munteanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583951496766">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583951496766</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/VpVrT">https://archive.ph/VpVrT</a>	21 nov 2025
139	Pavel Cojocar	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583869597590">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583869597590</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/ShWpO">https://archive.ph/ShWpO</a>	20 nov 2025
140	Galina Osoyanu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576839816150">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576839816150</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/YQDYk">https://archive.ph/YQDYk</a>	1 jun 2025
141	Alisa Ceban	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581484243227">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581484243227</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/w7Y7A">https://archive.ph/w7Y7A</a>	3 oct 2025
142	Shamil Shipon	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577123511702">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577123511702</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/jgEUd">https://archive.ph/jgEUd</a>	1 iun 2025
143	Veronica Cojocar	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585626420257">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585626420257</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/5pkGQ">https://archive.ph/5pkGQ</a>	24 dec 2025
144	Антон Никулеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576600516473">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576600516473</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/d3IQK">https://archive.ph/d3IQK</a>	1 iun 2025
145	Ada Myntan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585236706569">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585236706569</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/bX1Pm">https://archive.ph/bX1Pm</a>	23 dec 2025
146	Alina Cheban	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585587509529">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585587509529</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/jznYz">https://archive.ph/jznYz</a>	23 dec 2025
147	Ana Rusu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585490196508">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61585490196508</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/G7omx">https://archive.ph/G7omx</a>	24 dec 2025
148	Anastasia Boțan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583673326060">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583673326060</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/2z4I7">https://archive.ph/2z4I7</a>	7 mart 2026
149	Aurelia Jabun	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577084531677">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577084531677</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/0uKHJ">https://archive.ph/0uKHJ</a>	13 iun 2025
150	Șamira Josan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577027984109">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577027984109</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/yL6gZ">https://archive.ph/yL6gZ</a>	13 iun 2025
151	Stefan Cioară	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61586458605054">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61586458605054</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/Y6bel">https://archive.ph/Y6bel</a>	7 mar 2026
152	Veronica Grosu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576628684690">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576628684690</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/W0RcX">https://archive.ph/W0RcX</a>	31 mai 2025
153	Victor Toma	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583144365031">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583144365031</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/6Hxny">https://archive.ph/6Hxny</a>	29 oct 2025
154	Zâna Dorogan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576985295999">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576985295999</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/F1xXv">https://archive.ph/F1xXv</a>	12 iun 2025
155	Alina Balan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581453283931">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581453283931</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/dgev4">https://archive.ph/dgev4</a>	3 oct 2025
156	Violeta Ciulea	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576990124899">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576990124899</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/nZzHm">https://archive.ph/nZzHm</a>	

No.	Name Surname	Account link:	Date of creation / operationalisation
157	Виктория Балану	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577951692219">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577951692219</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/RE4IR">https://archive.ph/RE4IR</a>	25 jun 2025
158	Natalia Rotaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581695160944">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581695160944</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/pWpU7">https://archive.ph/pWpU7</a>	3 oct 2025
159	Marina Ceban	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581766197289">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581766197289</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/nQ5TJ">https://archive.ph/nQ5TJ</a>	2 oct 2025
160	Victoria Rotaru	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576984407612">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576984407612</a>	31 mai 2025
161	Вероника Русу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61586448134842">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61586448134842</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/9IN46">https://archive.ph/9IN46</a>	7 mar 2026 / 12 avr 2026
162	Василиса Чеботарь	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577394698057">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577394698057</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/NdsHP">https://archive.ph/NdsHP</a>	21 jun 2025 / 25 feb 2025
163	Viorica Schepu	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582186880291">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61582186880291</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/Of7lw">https://archive.ph/Of7lw</a>	8 mar 2026 / 11 apr 2026
164	Виолетта Монтяну	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=615787846409390">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=615787846409390</a>	19 jul 2025 / 6 aug 2025
165	Габриэла Дьяконеску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576971945632">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576971945632</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/TtQLZ">https://archive.ph/TtQLZ</a>	12 jun 2025 / 9 apr 2026
166	Alina Ciorba	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581432705725">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61581432705725</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/JMKBo">https://archive.ph/JMKBo</a>	3 oct 2025 / 12 jan 2026
167	Евгения Спыну	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578354870487">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578354870487</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/YGJPs">https://archive.ph/YGJPs</a>	15 jul 2025 / 24 jul 2025
168	Марика Албу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577277420518">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577277420518</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/OZ3ER">https://archive.ph/OZ3ER</a>	12 jun 2025 / 10 apr 2026
169	Лукрециу Теодореску	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577924933556">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61577924933556</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/R72GW">https://archive.ph/R72GW</a>	25 jun 2025 / 31 mar 2026
170	Diana Toma	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583562534378">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583562534378</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/wFmkm">https://archive.ph/wFmkm</a>	7 mar 2025 / 6 apr 2026
171	Юля Лупу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580517315635">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580517315635</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/q9kcx">https://archive.ph/q9kcx</a>	15 sept 2025 / 14 dec 2025
172	Водяну Василина	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578910671206">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61578910671206</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/7LXRl">https://archive.ph/7LXRl</a>	24 jul 2025 / 6 aug 2025
173	Aleina Damian	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579801960896">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61579801960896</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/bWBT7">https://archive.ph/bWBT7</a>	30 aug 2025 / 15 mar 2026
174	Дмитрий Лупу	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584035072491">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584035072491</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/DFgkR">https://archive.ph/DFgkR</a>	21 nov 2025 / 14 dec 2025
175	Violeta Balan	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583712117281">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61583712117281</a> <a href="https://archive.ph/FKAmf">https://archive.ph/FKAmf</a>	7 mar 2026 / 6 apr 2026

## ANNEX 9. QUESTIONS FROM DISSEMINATED SURVEYS

<p>Sunteți rezident permanent al Republicii Moldova? Marcați 1 răspuns</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Da</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Nu</p> <p><b>CONTINUE</b></p>	<p>Cum apreciați, în general, situația economică în țara noastră? Marcați 1 răspuns</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Foarte bună</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Mai degrabă bună</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Mai degrabă rea</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Foarte rea</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Greu de răspuns</p> <p><b>CONTINUE</b></p>
<p>Câți ani plini aveți?</p> <p><input checked="" type="radio"/> 41</p> <p><b>CONTINUE</b></p>	<p>Dacă duminica viitoare ar avea loc alegeri pentru Parlamentul Moldovei, cu ce partid ați vota? Marcați 1 răspuns</p> <p><input type="radio"/> „Partidul nostru” (R. Usatii)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Blocul „Victorie” (I. Sor)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova (V. Filat)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul „Respect Moldova” (M. Lupu)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul „Moldova Mare” (V. Fortuna)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul „Democrația acasă” (V. Kostjuk)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Blocul „Împreună” (S. Gligor și alții)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul „Acțiune și Solidaritate” (I. Grosu)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul Socialiștilor din Republica Moldova (I. Dodon)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova (V. Voronin)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul „Vitorul Moldovei” (V. Tarlev)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Înapoi Partidul „Inima Moldovei” (I. Vlah)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Partidul Social Democrat European (T. Ulianovschi)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Blocul „Alternativa” (A. Stoianoglo, I. Ceban, I. Chicu, M. Tkaciuk)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Alt partid (precizați) _____</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Nici pentru un partid</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Nu aș merge la vot</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Alt partid (precizați) _____</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Nici pentru un partid</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Nu aș merge la vot</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Voi veni și voi strica buletinul de vot</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Greu de răspuns</p>
<p>Vă rugăm să indicați sexul dvs. Marcați 1 răspuns</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Masculin</p> <p><input checked="" type="radio"/> Feminin</p> <p><b>CONTINUE</b></p>	

<p>Indicați în ce regiune/raion locuiți. Marcați 1 răspuns</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 48%;"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="radio"/> Municipiul Chișinău/ Municipiul Chișinău</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Anenii Noi/ Anenii Noi</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Călărași/ Călărași</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Cruleni/ Cruleni</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Dubăsari/ Dubăsari</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Hîncești/ Hîncești</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Ialoveni/ Ialoveni</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Nisporeni/ Nisporeni</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Orhei/ Orhei</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Rîșeni/ Rîșeni</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Sîngerei/ Sîngerei</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Sîrta/ Sîrta</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Ștefan Vodă/ Ștefan Vodă</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Taraclia/ Taraclia</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Ungheni/ Ungheni</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Municipiul Bălți/ Municipiul Bălți</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Briceni/ Briceni</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Dorohoi/ Dorohoi</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Drochia/ Drochia</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Edineț/ Edineț</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Fălești/ Fălești</li> </ul> </div> <div style="width: 48%;"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Fălești/ Fălești</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Florești/ Florești</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Godeanți/ Godeanți</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Ocnița/ Ocnița</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Rîșcani/ Rîșcani</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Sîngerei/ Sîngerei</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Soroca/ Soroca</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Bazarabeasca/ Bazarabeasca</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Cahul/ Cahul</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Cantemir/ Cantemir</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Căușeni/ Căușeni</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Cimișlia/ Cimișlia</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Leova/ Leova</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Ștefan Vodă/ Ștefan Vodă</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Raionul Taraclia/ Taraclia</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Unitatea Teritorială Autonomă Gagăuzia / UTA Gagăuzia</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Alte (notați) _____</li> </ul> </div> </div>	<p>Operațiunea militară specială a Rusiei în Ucraina continuă de la începutul anului 2022. În opinia dvs., decizia autorităților ruse de a lansa o operațiune militară specială este mai degrabă justificată sau mai degrabă nejustificată? Marcați 1 răspuns</p> <div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 10px;"> <div><input type="radio"/> Mai degrabă da</div> <div><input type="radio"/> Mai degrabă nu</div> <div><input type="radio"/> Greu de răspuns</div> </div>																																										
<p>Locuiești într-un oraș sau într-o zonă rurală? Marcați 1 răspuns</p> <div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 10px;"> <div><input type="radio"/> Oraș</div> <div><input type="radio"/> Sat</div> </div> <p style="text-align: center; color: red; font-weight: bold;">CONTINUE</p>	<p>În opinia dumneavoastră, care sunt cele mai acute probleme cu care se confruntă astăzi Republica Moldova? Bifați maximum 5 răspunsuri</p> <div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 5px;"> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Starea proastă a drumurilor și infrastructurii</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Calitatea slabă a serviciilor medicale</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Tarifele mari la serviciile comunale</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Corupția</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Nivelul scăzut al salariilor / pensilor</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Somajul</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Declinul industriei și agriculturii</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Emigrarea populației</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Prețurile ridicate la produsele alimentare</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Conducerea incompetentă</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Impozite prea mari</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Altele (specificați) _____</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Îmi este greu să răspund</div> </div>																																										
<p><b>S</b> Vă rugăm să spuneți cum ați reacționat la următoarele evenimente recente. Bifați un singur răspuns pentru fiecare rând.</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th style="text-align: center;">Pozitiv</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Negativ</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Indiferent</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Nu am auzit despre asta</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Îmi este greu să răspund</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Prelungirea până la 1 martie 2022 a regimului temporar în cadrul căruia se acordă protecție refugiaților ucraineni pe teritoriul Moldovei</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Inchiderea „Casei Ruse” din Chișinău</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Apelurile președintelui Moldovei, Maia Sandu, la unirea republicii cu România vecină și la organizarea unui referendum național pe această temă</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Presiunea exercitată de autoritățile actuale asupra Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldova</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Inițierea procedurii juridice de retragere a Moldovei din CSI</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Recomandările Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Federației Ruse adresate cetățenilor ruși de a se abține, pe cât posibil, de la călătorii în Moldova</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="radio"/></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Pozitiv	Negativ	Indiferent	Nu am auzit despre asta	Îmi este greu să răspund	Prelungirea până la 1 martie 2022 a regimului temporar în cadrul căruia se acordă protecție refugiaților ucraineni pe teritoriul Moldovei	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Inchiderea „Casei Ruse” din Chișinău	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Apelurile președintelui Moldovei, Maia Sandu, la unirea republicii cu România vecină și la organizarea unui referendum național pe această temă	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Presiunea exercitată de autoritățile actuale asupra Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldova	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Inițierea procedurii juridice de retragere a Moldovei din CSI	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Recomandările Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Federației Ruse adresate cetățenilor ruși de a se abține, pe cât posibil, de la călătorii în Moldova	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Pozitiv	Negativ	Indiferent	Nu am auzit despre asta	Îmi este greu să răspund																																						
Prelungirea până la 1 martie 2022 a regimului temporar în cadrul căruia se acordă protecție refugiaților ucraineni pe teritoriul Moldovei	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>																																						
Inchiderea „Casei Ruse” din Chișinău	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>																																						
Apelurile președintelui Moldovei, Maia Sandu, la unirea republicii cu România vecină și la organizarea unui referendum național pe această temă	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>																																						
Presiunea exercitată de autoritățile actuale asupra Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldova	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>																																						
Inițierea procedurii juridice de retragere a Moldovei din CSI	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>																																						
Recomandările Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Federației Ruse adresate cetățenilor ruși de a se abține, pe cât posibil, de la călătorii în Moldova	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>																																						

Vă rugăm să spuneți cum ați reacționat la următoarele evenimente recente. Bifați un singur răspuns pentru fiecare rând.

	Pozitiv	Negativ	Indiferent	Nu am auzit despre asta	Imi este greu să răspund
Prelungirea până la 1 martie 2022 a regimului temporar în cadrul căruia se acordă protecție refugiaților ucraineni pe teritoriul Moldovei	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Inchiderea „Casei Ruse” din Chișinău	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Apelurile președintelui Moldovei, Maia Sandu, la unirea republicii cu România vecină și la organizarea unui referendum național pe această temă	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Presiunea exercitată de autoritățile actuale asupra Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldova	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Inițierea procedurii juridice de retragere a Moldovei din CSI	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Recomandările Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Federației Ruse adresate cetățenilor ruși de a se abține, pe cât posibil, de la călătorii în Moldova	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ce părere aveți despre următorii politicieni?

	Am încredere	Nu am încredere	Nu cunosc această persoană	Neutru / Nu pot aprecia
Ilan Șor	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Igor Dodon	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Renato Usatîi	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Vladimir Plahotniuc	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Maia Sandu	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Vladimir Voronin	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alexandr Stolanoglo	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ion Chicu	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Vasile Tarlev	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dorin Recean	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Irina Vlah	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Igor Grosu	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Victoria Furtună	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ion Ceban	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Vlad Filat	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Eugenia Guțul	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Să schimbăm subiectul. Ce părere aveți despre următoarele țări și organizații internaționale? Bifați un singur răspuns pentru fiecare rând

	Pozitiv	Neutru	Negativ	Imi este greu să răspund
Uniunea Europeană	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
NATO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Germania	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
SUA	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Turcia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
România	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Italia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
China	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rusia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Uniunea Economică Euraslastică	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
CSI	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Franța	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ucraina	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ce părere aveți despre următorii lideri ai țărilor străine? Bifați un singur răspuns pentru fiecare rând:

	Pozitiv	Neutru	Negativ	Imi este greu să răspund
V. Putin	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Xi Jinping	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A. Lukașenko	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
R. Erdogan	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
N. Dan	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
V. Orban	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
F. Merz	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
E. Macron	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
D. Trump	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
V. Zelenski	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ce părere aveți despre următoarele afirmații privind politica externă a Republicii Moldova? Bifați un singur răspuns pentru fiecare rând:					
	Total de acord	Mai degrabă de acord	Mai degrabă nu sunt de acord	Categoric nu sunt de acord	Îmi este greu să răspund
Moldova trebuie să continue parcursul de integrare europeană	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova trebuie să devină membră NATO	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova trebuie să urmeze o politică externă multivectorială	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova trebuie să se unească cu România într-un singur stat	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova trebuie să rămână membră a CSI	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova nu trebuie să renunțe la principiul constituțional al neutralității	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova trebuie să normalizeze relațiile cu Rusia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova trebuie să soluționeze pasnic conflictul pridenstrovian prin acordarea unui statut de autonomie regiunii din stânga Nistrului	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Moldova ar trebui să ofere tot sprijinul posibil Ucrainei în timpul conflictului cu Rusia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ce credeți că se întâmplă acum în Ucraina? Marcați 1 răspuns	Cine este vinovat în primul rând pentru aducerea situației din Ucraina la un conflict militar? Nu marcați mai mult de 3 răspunsuri
<input type="radio"/> Încercarea Rusiei de a cucerii Ucraina <input type="radio"/> Protecția populației rusofone din DNR și LNR <input type="radio"/> Războiul dintre Rusia și Occident pe teritoriul Ucrainei <input type="radio"/> Începutul unui nou război mondial <input type="radio"/> Greu de răspuns	<input type="checkbox"/> Toate țările și organizațiile enumerate <input type="checkbox"/> SUA <input type="checkbox"/> Rusia <input type="checkbox"/> OTAN <input type="checkbox"/> Ucraina <input type="checkbox"/> UE <input type="checkbox"/> Nimeni <input type="checkbox"/> Altele (specificați) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Greu de răspuns

Dacă vorbim despre cea mai realistă opțiune pentru a pune capăt conflictului din Ucraina, care dintre acestea este cea mai probabilă, în opinia dvs., luând în considerare diverși factori? Marcați 1 răspuns	Vă rugăm să indicați ce surse de informații utilizați cel mai des? Puteți selecta orice număr de răspunsuri
<input type="radio"/> Încheierea păcii cu păstrarea de noi teritorii pentru Rusia <input type="radio"/> Retragerea completă a trupelor ruse din Ucraina cu compensarea daunelor cauzate <input type="radio"/> Lichidarea Ucrainei ca stat independent <input type="radio"/> Altă opțiune (scrieți-o) _____ <input type="radio"/> Greu de răspuns	<input type="checkbox"/> Radio <input type="checkbox"/> Alte aplicații de mesagerie („WhatsApp”, „Viber” etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Rețelele de socializare „Twitter” și/sau „Facebook” și/sau „Instagram” <input type="checkbox"/> Aplicația de mesagerie MAX <input type="checkbox"/> Nu pot să răspund <input type="checkbox"/> Televiziune <input type="checkbox"/> „YouTube” <input type="checkbox"/> „Telegram” <input type="checkbox"/> Rețelele de socializare „VKontakte” și/sau „Odnoklassnik” <input type="checkbox"/> Site-uri de știri online <input type="checkbox"/> Altele (precizați) _____

**ANNEX 10. INFRASTRUCTURE ASSOCIATED WITH IP 161.35.21.131 AND TARGETED COUNTRIES**

Domain	Original link	Facebook	GA4	Country	IP
adistem.com	https://adistem.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566179344721	G-BMV8HQWFDM	HU	161.35.21.131
<b>thecisclub.com</b>	<b><u>https://thecisclub.com/</u></b>	<b>facebook.com/profile.php?id=61570984923500</b>	<b>G-C6JFYQZHLG</b>	<b>MD</b>	161.35.21.131
amaofl.com	https://amaofl.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567069210671	G-D8C3DE9R4P	CZ	161.35.21.131
joshuacross.com	https://joshuacross.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61571149033638	G-6CVNP01QP5	DK	161.35.21.131
maruinc.com	https://maruinc.com/		G-DF5LH52236	PL	161.35.21.131
catseller.com	https://catseller.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61559211142680	G-GJCJD47JSV	LT	161.35.21.131
akccanine.com	https://akccanine.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567292630058	G-3WMRKEH4H9	CZ	161.35.21.131
onlinepesa.com	https://onlinepesa.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566775899028	G-4GPG3KMS0Y	SK	161.35.21.131
afaqhotel.com	https://afaqhotel.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61561956884943	G-MM9EN7TDK2	BG	161.35.21.131
sweeteez-shop.com	https://sweeteez-shop.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61586757880461	G-DXM97W0740	t	161.35.21.131
albanylandbank.com	https://albanylandbank.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61587034046933	G-B8K34QZD09	JP	161.35.21.131
vertigogympark.com	https://vertigogympark.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566292534889	G-KS3YNF9KY0	BG	161.35.21.131
inseptostore.com	https://inseptostore.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567000453042	G-CX97DEF29C	NL	161.35.21.131
babiloncity.com	https://babiloncity.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=100077238751316	G-NKGML44H8W	u	161.35.21.131
telvalley.com	https://telvalley.com/		G-B2E1JHBJLV	FR	161.35.21.131
comicgyan.com	https://comicgyan.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61575139416142	G-K2Z6LL0D9Y	IT	161.35.21.131
foreverfitnesscenter.com	https://foreverfitnesscenter.com/	facebook.com/DenniTelegrafie	G-Q523KX14GW	SK	161.35.21.131
ark420.com	https://ark420.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566292534889	G-WHH7L4Y9KZ	BG	161.35.21.131
sunbonnetsmart.com	https://sunbonnetsmart.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566649782859	G-GY7ET462C7	EN	161.35.21.131
chancefree.com	https://chancefree.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567134815268	G-W5CNZL9BJG	SK	161.35.21.131
mjstatuszone.com	https://mjstatuszone.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567292630058	G-F2SZBK5VXX	CZ	161.35.21.131
simplefoody.com	https://simplefoody.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566664913477	G-M1DGLG8ND2	GR	161.35.21.131
grandcanyondot.com	https://grandcanyondot.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61570618627079	G-RWFCXL7HXH	of	161.35.21.131
perkandparcel.com	https://perkandparcel.com/		G-0LPGE1RSZP	ES	161.35.21.131
kinvarafarmersmarket.com	https://kinvarafarmersmarket.com/		G-BTGWMFXJF1	PL	161.35.21.131
hieupham.com	https://hieupham.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61561422706438	G-VRCW6VCN15	SL	161.35.21.131
traveloupe.com	https://traveloupe.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089862768137	G-QZE5L89W2E	BG	161.35.21.131
anmolrishte.com	https://anmolrishte.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61570927061969	G-4NQ2LS3ZC2	HU	161.35.21.131
sufitoursandtravels.com	https://sufitoursandtravels.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61574744697228	G-YJFTCVDPTK	CZ	161.35.21.131
mastersaustria.com	https://mastersaustria.com/		G-KHLP21TPN3	EN	161.35.21.131
opticalradio.com	https://opticalradio.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61571173193100	G-RDCNBRG31D	MK	161.35.21.131
smashjackson.com	https://smashjackson.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61570570486680	G-JRXDHCHXG7	KZ	161.35.21.131
baixarfilmesonline.org	https://baixarfilmesonline.org/	facebook.com/jiznodna23	G-GGTZKGW1SK	u	161.35.21.131

divilay.com	http://divilay.com/			<b>UK</b>	161.35.21.131
movbb.com	https://movbb.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567243700705	G-TF22WPLE6V	<b>CZ</b>	161.35.21.131
momentumadvocacy.com	https://momentumadvocacy.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566500037045	G-M0NJHQH93R	<b>GR</b>	161.35.21.131
idemyx.com	https://idemyx.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61568449449355	G-YTL2RD0H83	<b>SRB</b>	161.35.21.131
bylatinos.com	https://bylatinos.com/	facebook.com/RubikKocka0	G-J2QW9X8330	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
thebodysoul.com	https://thebodysoul.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61569238044148	G-YX4V4HQQPD	<b>CZ</b>	161.35.21.131
chamomilesanctuary.com	http://chamomilesanctuary.com/			<b>BG</b>	161.35.21.131
smokeso.com	https://smokeso.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61561982222917	G-1YJWMWLEFN	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
phone-doctors.com	https://phone-doctors.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61568823775511	G-HBQG6Q2C4C	<b>EN</b>	161.35.21.131
infokerjaya.com	https://infokerjaya.com/		G-LJPH5QK12N	<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
deuschurch.com	https://deuschurch.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61565809186804	G-1J11BQ70W0	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
fbh.am	https://fbh.am/		G-QC0GRPHLYL	<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
universidy.com	https://universidy.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61561927453602	G-CN5ZG7YEXW	<b>BG</b>	161.35.21.131
treecatering.com	https://treecatering.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61568779677657	G-MDXWN7RH89	<b>EN</b>	161.35.21.131
restfullyou.com	https://restfullyou.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61561801081469	G-GZK3TQQ6BN	<b>HR</b>	161.35.21.131
ericbanashphotography.com	https://ericbanashphotography.com/		G-CMPGBCR2R6	<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
gadgetmovies.com	https://gadgetmovies.com/		G-7212CF7LMJ	<b>GR</b>	161.35.21.131
textrays.com	https://textrays.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61560623908533	G-JRPRRTEB4N	<b>SRB</b>	161.35.21.131
snapkid.com	https://snapkid.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61559987040857	G-GYR7QTTFNN	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
mobiledetailsd.com	https://mobiledetailsd.com/		G-N0929BTHVZ	<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
welovemaui.com	https://welovemaui.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61575088594046	G-4Z4VN07J3H	<b>EAST</b>	161.35.21.131
doctorconstipation.com	http://doctorconstipation.com/			<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
foromo.com	https://foromor.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61570540300456	G-9EKF5V8PGM	<b>IV</b>	161.35.21.131
intersectioncenter.com	https://intersectioncenter.com/			<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
exellera.com	https://exellera.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566500037045	G-3CGVHMCFSF	<b>GR</b>	161.35.21.131
apuestas.me	http://apuestas.me/			<b>CZ</b>	161.35.21.131
ecoplate.com	https://ecoplaca.com/	facebook.com/svobodapravdy0	G-7ZN4J6M569	<b>CZ</b>	161.35.21.131
vivaairline.com	https://vivaairline.com/		G-JV91DVCJ0J	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
ayliktv.com	https://ayliktv.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567433483633	G-YQLXWZCHZ3	<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
larsenacademy.com	https://larsenacademy.com/		G-4GZQXBWVXN	<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
corpslibre.com	https://corpslibre.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61575785605274	G-ZQ42TQBNR1	<b>NO</b>	161.35.21.131
aanlive.com	https://aanlive.com/		G-2BKF19KPEC	<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
semeruslot.com	https://semeruslot.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61572781741935	G-LDG39TGPHG	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
lemelon.com	https://lemelon.com/	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566649782859	G-TBWWT3MDZ0	<b>EN</b>	161.35.21.131

translationhealth.com	<a href="https://translationhealth.com/">https://translationhealth.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566740062343	G-G8ZF4S3W73	<b>GR</b>	161.35.21.131
newaltitudemusic.com	<a href="https://newaltitudemusic.com/">https://newaltitudemusic.com/</a>	facebook.com/ZajimaveVedet0/	G-3T7BCE8BWB	<b>SK</b>	161.35.21.131
netpflix.com	<a href="http://netpflix.com/">http://netpflix.com/</a>			<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
elitefinancial.org	<a href="http://elitefinancial.org/">http://elitefinancial.org/</a>			<b>PL</b>	161.35.21.131
yogafortheglobe.com	<a href="https://yogafortheglobe.com/">https://yogafortheglobe.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61573261076744	G-4MDPX0XVB7	<b>BE</b>	161.35.21.131
creationthai.com	<a href="https://creationthai.com/">https://creationthai.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584651954195	G-M0B2E25M23	<b>for</b>	161.35.21.131
sunkey-service.com	<a href="https://sunkey-service.com/">https://sunkey-service.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61584751263216	G-QQLS3ZZSHZ	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
zombiehomes.co	<a href="https://zombiehomes.co/">https://zombiehomes.co/</a>		G-9E0T9JGC57	<b>HU</b>	161.35.21.131
coupononealo.com	<a href="https://cuponealo.com/">https://cuponealo.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61561483962237	G-577YM900ZS	<b>CZ</b>	161.35.21.131
aerialtheoryfitness.com	<a href="https://aerialtheoryfitness.com/">https://aerialtheoryfitness.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61575092219836	G-8ZNVEVLG6T	<b>CZ</b>	161.35.21.131
houstonautospot.com	<a href="https://houstonautospot.com/">https://houstonautospot.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61566043154182	G-0875ED52EJ	<b>GR</b>	161.35.21.131
herbalvitas.com	<a href="https://herbalvitas.com/">https://herbalvitas.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61573544991299	G-Y1FJYWZ5EX	<b>it</b>	161.35.21.131
mancounty.com	<a href="https://mancounty.com/">https://mancounty.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61568543045859	G-TP17FSCPTX	<b>MK</b>	161.35.21.131
youngbucks skin.com	<a href="https://youngbucks skin.com/">https://youngbucks skin.com/</a>	facebook.com/VsechnozeSveta	G-XZWRGM50TE	<b>CZ</b>	161.35.21.131
novusinfotech.com	<a href="https://novusinfotech.com/">https://novusinfotech.com/</a>	facebook.com/profile.php?id=61567214911468	G-1268JDJWVS	<b>OF</b>	161.35.21.131